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In general, properties realize certain roles in the workings of nature.  For example, mass 
makes objects resist acceleration.  But what is the relationship between these roles and 
the properties that realize them?  According to ‘quidditism’, the roles are contingently 
realized by the properties that in fact realize them.  Opponents charge that quidditism 
implies the existence of epiphenomenal and unknowable “quiddities” or “inner natures”.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to argue in favor of quidditism and explore its 
epistemic and pragmatic consequences. 
I begin by showing that certain considerations from physics show that properties 
cannot be individuated via their nomological roles, as anti-quidditism maintains.  I then 
argue that quidditism can be had without epiphenomenal and unknowable quiddities.  
The arguments to the contrary proceed either from a misconception of what quidditism is, 
or they rely on an implicit assumption to the effect that quidditism implies that there is 
something in virtue of which properties are individuated from one another. 
I turn next to an examination of quidditism’s epistemic implications.  Here I 
develop and defend a posthumously published paper by David Lewis.  Following Lewis, 
I argue that quidditism implies that we will never know which properties realize at least 
some of the nomological roles.  At the core of my case is an argument against the 
common claim that quidditist skepticism is merely a species of traditional external-world 
skepticism. 
Finally, having argued that quidditistic skepticism importantly differs from 
traditional external-world skepticism, I explore which, if either of these two types of 
skepticism have practical implications—that is, implications for how we ought to live 
our lives.  I begin by getting clearer on the distinction between traditional external-world 
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skepticism and quidditistic skepticism, showing that the former is of a kind I call 
‘Cartesian skepticism’, while the latter is of a kind I call ‘Kantian skepticism’.  A 
skepticism is Cartesian, on my terminology, if it posits ignorance of graspable facts; 
while it is Kantian if it posits ignorance of ungraspable facts.  Finally, I argue that, in 
general, Cartesian skepticisms have drastic practical implications while Kantian 







WHAT IS QUIDDITISM? 
 
 
What is the relationship between a property and its role in the workings of nature?  For 
example, what is the relationship between mass and its role of making objects resist 
acceleration?  Is mass inextricably linked with its role, or is there a sense in which the two 
are distinct?  According to one view, properties and their roles can in some sense ‘come 
apart’.  The unfortunate name for this thesis is ‘quidditism’, and its recently come in for 
some heavy criticism. 
Now I can’t do anything about quidditism’s awkward name, but this dissertation is 
largely an attempt to defend its reputation.  In the chapters that follow I will be primarily 
interested in three questions: (1) Is quidditism true? (2) Does quidditism have any 
epistemic implications? And (3) do the epistemic implications of quidditism, if there are 
any, have any practical significance?  These, respectively, are the questions of the three 
chapters that follow, and my answers will be ‘yes’, ‘yes’, and ‘no’. 
But before we get to these topics, we need to know more precisely what quidditism 
is.  Although the term has been in the literature since David Armstrong’s (1989), it has 
been less than clear what quidditism is supposed to be.  In particular, there seems to be a 
tension between the ways that ‘quidditism’ has been defined and the way that ‘quidditism’ 
has been used.  Getting clear on these matters is the primary task of the present chapter.  At 
the end, there will be a brief outline of the chapters to come. 
I said that the rough idea behind quidditism is that properties in some sense ‘come 
apart from’ their roles in nature (hereafter, their ‘nomological roles’).  To make this 
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precise, we need to answer two questions: what do we mean by ‘a property’s nomological 
role’, and what do we mean when we say that properties ‘come apart from’ their 
nomological roles? 
 
Section One:  What do we Mean by ‘a Property’s Nomological Role’? 
This question is relatively easy.  To take a simple example, suppose we live in a Newtonian 
world.  Then the property mass figures in the law that between any two objects with mass 
there is force proportional to the product of their masses divided by the square of the 
distance between them (Newton’s Law of Gravitation).  It also figures in the law that the 
net force on a given object is equal to the product of its mass and acceleration (Newton’s 
Second Law of Motion).  The nomological role of mass is simply the role of being the 
property x such that between any two objects with x there is a force proportional to the 
products of their respective amounts of x, divided by the square of the distance between 
them, and the net force on any object is equal to the product of its amount of x and its 
acceleration. 
More generally, when we say that a property plays a certain nomological role, we 
mean that it is the property that does such and such, where the ‘such and such’ is defined in 
the following way.  Start by considering each fundamental natural law in which the given 
property figures.  Now conjoin the statements of each of these laws into one long sentence.  
Now replace each occurrence of the word for the property in question with a free variable.  
That gives us an open sentence ‘…x…’.  The role of the given property is thus the role of 
being the property x such that… x…. 
 Every definition of ‘quidditism’ that I know of agrees that roles are to be defined in 
this way.  The more difficult question is the second question mentioned above: what do we 
mean when we say that a property ‘comes apart from’ its role?  I will be answering this 
question in the course of the next two sections.  My strategy will be to begin with the most 
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widely cited definition of ‘quidditism’, which I will then tweak, step by step, into an 
acceptable definition. 
 
Section Two:  Paying Our Respects to Black’s Definition 
One common way for philosophers to precisify rough ideas about distinctness, or about one 
thing’s ‘coming apart from’ another, is in terms of what could have been.  Moreover, 
philosophers have tried to understand talk about what could have been in terms of possible 
worlds.  (For now, simply think of a possible world as a maximally specific way that things 
could have been.)  Putting these two ideas together, philosophers often formulate theses 
about distinctness directly in terms of possible worlds. 
The most widely cited,1 and the first explicitly given definition of ‘quidditism’,2 
does exactly this.  In Robert Black’s ‘Against Quidditism’ (2000) he writes 
 
[According to one view,] nothing constitutes the fact that a certain quality playing a 
certain nomological role in that world is identical with a certain quality playing a 
different role in ours; they just are the same quality, and that's all that can be said. 
Since the fashion is to mine the Scottish tradition for technical terms in this area, let 
us use the word 'quidditism' for the acceptance of primitive identity between 
fundamental qualities across possible worlds.  (p.92) 
 
According to this definition, quidditism is the thesis that when a property that plays a 
certain nomological role in one possible world is identical to a property that plays a 
                                                
1 For example, Stephen Mumford (2004: 151) and David Lewis (2008: 7) both cite Black’s definition.  And 
although she doesn’t cite Black, Ann Whittle (2006) defines quidditism as ‘the acceptance of primitive 
property identity across possible worlds’ (p. 463).   
2 Although Armstrong (1989) uses the term ‘quidditism’, he never explicitly defines it.  It is clear from the 
context, however, what he means by it.  Armstrong’s (implicit) definition of ‘quidditism’ is discussed at 
length in section four of the present chapter. 
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different nomological role in another possible world, there is nothing that constitutes the 
fact that the one property is the same property as the ‘other’. 
 Notice that, taken quite literally, quidditism on Black’s definition is compatible 
with the view that it is never the case that a property playing one role in one world is 
identical with a property playing a different role in a different world—it merely says that 
when that happens, there is nothing that constitutes the fact that the one property is 
identical with the other.  Indeed, if that were never the case, then quidditism, on Black’s 
definition, would be vacuously true.   
Almost certainly Black did not intend his definition to be taken quite so literally.  
Rather, he intended quidditism to be the thesis that there are cases in which a property 
playing one role in one world is identical with a property playing a different role in another 
world, and when this happens there is nothing that constitutes the fact that the one property 
is identical with the other.  Let’s call this  
 
Black’s Definition.  Sometimes, a property that plays one role in one world is 
identical with a property that plays a different role in a different world, and when 
this happens there is nothing that constitutes the fact that the one property is 
identical with the other. 
 
Formulating Black’s definition this way, we can see that the second conjunct—the 
conjunct which we originally took to be all of quidditism on Black’s definition—is actually 
quite trivial.  Suppose that a property playing a certain nomological role in one world really 
is identical with a property playing a certain nomological role in another world.  When we 
ask whether something constitutes this fact, what are we asking?  Taken literally, we are 
asking this: given a property P that plays one role in one world and a different role in 
another world, 
 
1.  What constitutes the fact that P = P? 
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That the answer to this question should be ‘nothing’ seems quite obvious.  As Lewis (1986) 
has put it, 
 
There is never any problem of what makes something identical to itself; nothing can 
ever fail to be.  And there is never any problem about what makes two things 
identical; two things never can be identical.  (pp.192 – 93)3 
 
We should say exactly this in response to Black’s suggestion that the debate over 
quidditism should be understood, in part, as a debate over whether there is anything that 
makes (i.e. constitutes the fact that) a property in one world is identical with a property in 
another.  As it is with respect to individuals, the answer to that question is easy: nothing 
makes something identical with itself, nothing constitutes the fact that a property is 
identical with itself. 
 The first, and implicit, part of Black’s definition of ‘quidditism’ is the important 
part: there is a non-trivial debate over whether a property in one world is ever identical 
with a property playing a different role in different world.  According, let us drop the 
second conjunct from Black’s definition and call the resulting definition 
 
The Transworld-identity Definition.  Sometimes, a property that plays a certain 
nomological role in one world is identical with a property that plays a different 
nomological role in a different world. 
 
                                                
3 Lewis is here responding to the suggestion that the debate over haecceitism (which is to individuals as 
quidditism is to properties—see below) is a debate over whether there is something that makes an individual 
in one world identical with an individual in another, supposing that there are such individuals.  He is 
responding by saying that the answer to that question is easy: nothing ever makes something identical with 
itself. 
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Now we’re getting closer.  But not close enough. 
First, this definition makes quidditism seem like a thesis about identity—in 
particular, about transworld identity.  But this puts the emphasis in the wrong place.  Here 
we can take another page from Lewis’s (1986) book. 
 
We do state plenty of problems in terms of identity.  But we needn’t state them so.  
Therefore, they are not problems about identity.  Is it ever so that an F is identical to 
a G?  That is, is it ever so that the same thing is an F, and also a G?  More simply, is 
it ever so that an F is a G?  The identity drops out. (p. 193) 
 
It’s misleading to say that we are interested in the question of whether one property playing 
one role in one world is ever identical with a property playing a different role in another 
world.  To make the proper emphasis clear, we should follow Lewis’s advice and let ‘the 
identity drop out’. Let’s call the resulting definition of ‘quidditism’ 
 
The Same-property/Different-role Definition.  Sometimes, a property that plays 
one nomological role in one world plays a different nomological role in a different 
world.4 
 
I think that the same-property/different-role definition successfully captures something one 
might mean when he says that properties ‘come apart from’ their nomological roles.  
Unfortunately, this definition is still unsatisfactory, and for two reasons. 
Here’s the first reason.  Above I suggested that you think of possible worlds, for the 
time being, as maximally specific ways that things might have been.  But not all theorists 
agree that possible worlds should be understood in this way.  So-called modal realists 
                                                
4 Note that this definition of ‘quidditism’ is equivalent to the former.  Their different names merely reflect the 
difference in emphasis.  (The identity doesn’t really drop out; the mention of identity drops out.) 
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claim that possible worlds are things just like the actual world: they are hunks of concrete 
space and time (or spacetime) that may or may not contain concrete material objects or 
physical fields.  Unfortunately, such a view makes trouble for the same-property/different-
role definition of quidditism.  And although modal realism is by no means the most popular 
view of possible worlds, we need to make room for it. 
To see how modal realism causes trouble for our above definition of ‘quidditism’, 
suppose you’re a modal realist and you think that properties are ‘world-bound’ entities—
that is, suppose you think that one and the same property is never present at more than one 
possible world.  In that case, ‘quidditism’ on the same-property/different-role definition 
will be trivially false: since mass exists only in this world, there is no world where mass 
plays a different role  Still, you might think that the proper analysis of sentences like ‘Mass 
could have played a different role’ is in terms of counterparts: ‘Mass could have played a 
different role’ is true if and only if there is a possible world in which a counterpart of mass 
plays a role distinction from the role played by mass in this world.  But to say that mass 
could have played a different role is certainly to say that mass is in some sense distinct 
from its role.  Thus, although the same-property/different-role definition seems to force this 
kind of a modal realist into rejecting quidditism, there is a very important sense in which 
such a modal realist can still claim that properties come apart from their roles. 
No later than we suggest this problem do we see its solution.  It seems that 
‘quidditism’ ought to be defined as follows: 
 
The Anti-supervenience Definition.  For any property P and its nomological role 
R, P could have played some role other than R. 
 
According to this definition, quidditism is the view that nomological roles do not supervene 
on the properties that realize them.  To say that one thing supervenes on another is just to 
say that things could not have been different with respect to the former unless they were 
different with respect to the latter.  On the above definition, quidditism is the view that 
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things could have been different with respect to which role is realized without having been 
different with respect to which property realized the role. 
 Here we choose to define quidditism not in terms of possible worlds, but simply in 
terms of what could have been.  This leaves room for modal realists and others to disagree 
about how best to understand talk of what could have been, without immediately forcing 
them to accept/reject quidditism.  The modal realist who thinks properties are world-bound 
and uses counterparts to evaluate possibility claims, for example, can either accept 
quidditism, saying that there is a world in which a counterpart of mass plays a role distinct 
from mass’s actual role, or reject quidditism, saying there is no such counterpart of mass. 
Now we’re getting pretty close to a workable definition of ‘quidditism’.  Still, I said 
that there is a second problem for the same-property/different-role definition, and that 
problem is not avoided by moving to the above anti-supervenience definition.  I discuss the 
problem and its solution in the next section. 
 
Section Three: Haecceitism, Quidditistic Skepticism, and a New Definition 
To see why there is a problem for the above definition of ‘quidditism’, I want to briefly 
discuss the analogy between quidditism and haecceitism.  Haecceitism, quite roughly, is the 
view that individuals ‘come apart from’ their qualitative characters.  There have been 
several attempts to make haecceitism more precise, but most theorists now follow Lewis 
(1986) in defining ‘haecceitism’ as an anti-supervenience thesis. 
 
The Anti-supervenience Definition of ‘Haecceitism’.  For any individual A and 
its qualitative character C, C might have been had by some individual other than A.5   
                                                
5 This is almost Lewis’s (1986) definition of ‘haecceitism’.  A bit more precisely, Lewis defines ‘haecceitism’ 
as the view that there are at least two possible worlds w1 and w2 such that (1) w1 and w2 are qualitatively 
exactly alike, and yet (2) there is some actual individual A such that the counterpart of A in w1 has a different 
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Quidditism, it is often said, is meant to be to properties as haecceitism is to individuals.  
And the above anti-supervenience definition of ‘quidditism’ preserves this analogy quite 
nicely.  But not perfectly: while haecceitism denies that individuals supervene on their 
qualitative characters, quidditism, on the above definition, denies that a property’s role 
supervenes on it.  In other words, the direction of supervenience denied by haecceitism is 
not analogous to the direction of supervenience denied by quidditism. 
 Of course, this disanalogy is little reason to reject one definition of ‘quidditism’ in 
favor of another.  Why should we take the alleged analogy between haecceitism and 
quidditism so seriously?  After all, the two theses are only supposed to be analogous in so 
far as they both hold that one type of thing ‘comes apart from’ another type of thing, and 
the phrase ‘comes apart from’ is quite ambiguous: one way to make it precise is to deny 
supervenience in one direction; another way is to deny supervenience in the other direction.  
Why not simply rest content with having haecceitism deny supervenience in one direction 
and quidditism deny it in the other?  Fortunately, we have good reason to take the analogy 
seriously: the way quidditism has been used.   
The primary use of quidditism within the philosophical literature is to support a 
particular epistemological position known as ‘quiddistic skepticism’.  Roughly, quiddistic 
skepticism is the view that we will never come to know which properties realize the 
fundamental nomological roles realized at our world.  David Lewis (2008) is the champion 
of quiddistic skepticism, and his argument can be summarized as follows. 
 
If there are facts about which properties realize which roles—that is, facts over and 
above the mere facts about which roles are realized—then those fact are beyond the 
realm of empirical inquiry.  Let us call these worrisome facts, if there are any, 
                                                
qualitative character than the counterpart of A in w2.  Are these definitions equivalent?  I think they are, but 
the difference between them, if there is any, needn’t concern us here. 
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‘quidditistic facts’.  According to quidditism, there are quidditistic facts, because 
quidditism is the view that properties ‘come apart from’ their roles.  But quidditistic 
facts are contingent facts about our world and, hence, if they are beyond the realm 
of empirical inquiry, then they are simply unknowable. 
 
Of course, this line of reasoning needs much explaining and defense, and this is the task of 
Chapter Two.  For now, let us simply focus on the role of quidditism in the argument, 
which is to imply that there are facts beyond the mere facts about which roles are 
realized—namely, there are facts about which property realizes those roles.  Our question is 
thus this: does quidditism, on the anti-supervenience definition given above, imply that 
there are such facts? 
 Unfortunately, it does not.  Consider mass and its nomological role, call it ‘R’.  
Suppose that mass could have realized some role distinct from R.  If so, then quidditism, on 
the anti-supervenience definition above, is true.  Still, it is consistent with this that, 
necessarily, if R is realized, then R is realized by mass.  (Just imagine a possible world in 
which R is not realized and mass or its counterpart realizes some role other than R.)  Now 
consider (1) the proposition that R is realized and (2) the proposition that mass realizes R.  
Since at every possible world where R is realized, it is realized by mass (we are supposing), 
(1) necessarily implies (2).  And since at every possible world where mass realizes R, R is 
realized (trivially), (2) necessarily implies (1).  Hence, propositions (1) and (2) are 
necessarily equivalent.  Thus, if facts are individuated no more fine-grainedly than 
necessarily equivalent propositions, then the fact that mass realizes R just is the fact that R 
is realized.6  In that case, there is no fact about which property realizes R that is beyond the 
mere fact that R is realized—that is, there is no quiddistic fact about the role R. 
                                                
6 What if facts are individuated more finely than necessarily equivalent propositions?  In that case, there 
might still be a fact about which property realizes R that is beyond the mere fact that R is realized.   But if 
there is such a fact, its existence has nothing to do with quidditism on the above definition.  Again, we’re in 
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What we have just seen is that denying that roles supervene on the properties that 
realize them does imply that there are quiddistic facts.  But now the solution should be 
coming into view: to get quidditistic facts we need to deny that properties supervene on 
their roles. 
 
The Revised Anti-supervenience Definition.  For any property P and its 
nomological role R, R might have been realized by some property other than P. 
 
On this definition, quidditism clearly implies that there are quiddistic facts.  If there is a 
possible world where R is realized but not realized by mass or a counterpart of mass, then 
propositions (1) and (2) are non-equivalent—the proposition that mass realizes R is more 
specific than the proposition that R is realized.  Thus, if facts are individuated at least as 
finely as propositions, there is a fact about which property realizes R that is beyond the 
mere fact that R is realized. 
We are now several steps removed from Black’s definition of ‘quidditism’.  
Nonetheless, the above definition is to be preferred to all the others.  Unlike Black’s 
original definition, it makes quidditism non-trivial; unlike the transworld-identity 
definition, it captures the intuitive idea of properties ‘coming apart from’ their roles; unlike 
the same-property/different-role definition, it’s as congenial to those who think that 
properties are world-bound as those who don’t; and unlike the original anti-supervenience 
definition, it makes quidditism imply that there are quiddistic facts.  In addition to all this, 
the revised anti-supervenience definition makes the analogy between quidditism and 
haecceitism (on Lewis’s definition) just about as tight as it can be.  For these reasons, I 
henceforth adopt the revised anti-supervenience definition as my official definition of 
‘quidditism’. 
                                                
search of a definition of ‘quidditism’ according to which quidditism plays a key role in implying the existence 
of such facts. 
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We arrived at our preferred definition of ‘quidditism’ by starting with Black’s 
definition and working out the kinks.  But there is another place we might have started in 
search for a definition, and it wouldn’t do justice to our topic not to consider that starting 
point here. 
 
Section Four: Quiddityism 
I noted above that although Black (2000) was the first to explicitly define ‘quidditism’, he 
was not the first to use the term.  That title would seem to go to David Armstrong (1989), 
who first used the term ‘quidditism’ as follows. 
 
Haecceitism for individuals is parallel to Quidditism for universals.  Quidditism for 
universals seems very plausible.  Each universal must surely have its own nature. 
(p. 59) 
 
Although Armstrong does not explicitly define ‘quidditism’, it’s clear from the context how 
he understands it: 
 
Armstrong’s Definition.  Each property has its own nature.7 
 
Armstrong had previously introduced the term ‘quiddity’, which he understands as a 
property’s ‘nature’ (p. 44, 55).  So for Armstrong, quidditism is simply the acceptance of 
quiddities. 
 What might Armstrong mean here by ‘nature’ or ‘quiddity’?  Clearly, he cannot 
take a property’s quiddity to be its nomological role.  If we understood ‘quiddity’ or 
                                                
7 If not all properties are ‘genuine universals’, I hereby stipulate that I use the term ‘property’ to refer only to 
the latter. 
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‘nature’ in that way, then quidditism on Armstrong’s definition clearly wouldn’t capture 
anything one might mean when she says that properties ‘come apart from’ their roles. 
 Much more plausibly, quiddity is to be understood on analogy with haecceity.  
Indeed, on p. 44 Armstrong writes, ‘[P]roperties and relations do have their own haecceity, 
or, better, their quiddity or nature.’  A haecceity is supposed to be an individual’s thisness, 
where an individual’s thisness is a non-qualitative property that serves to individuate that 
individual from all other individuals.  If we like, we can say it is the property of being this 
individual.  Now Armstrong denies that there are such properties as haecceities.  But he 
seems to think that we have a clear enough grasp of what a haecceity would be to 
understand, by analogy, what a quiddity is supposed to be.  Taking the analogy seriously, 
let’s say that a quiddity is a property’s suchness, where a property’s suchness is a non-role-
involving (second-order) property that serves to individuate that property from all other 
properties. 
 Many authors have understood ‘quiddity’ in exactly this way, and many have 
followed Armstrong in taking quidditism to be the acceptance of quiddities.  These authors 
accept a definition of ‘quidditism’ that I’ll call 
 
Quiddityism.  Each possible property has its own quiddity, where a property’s 
quiddity is a non-role-involving (second-order) property that serves to individuate 
that (first-order) property from all other properties. 
 
What then is the relationship between quidditism, on our official definition, and 
quiddityism?  Some authors seem to have treated them as though they were equivalent, or 
as those one entails the other.  In the next chapter I argue that neither is the case: quiddities 
can be had without quidditism, and, even more importantly, quidditism can be had without 
quiddities.  I think that much of the resistance to quidditism has stemmed from an 
understandable fear of ‘quiddities’.  But if what I say in Chapter One is correct, fear of 
quiddities ought not become fear of quidditism. 
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Section Five:  Chapter Outline 
Having settled on an acceptable definition of ‘quidditism’, it’s time to get down to brass 
tacks.  I begin in Chapter One by defending quidditism against its two most common 
objections.  The first objection is an argument from how properties are individuated.  
According to this argument, properties are individuated by their nomological roles, and 
hence any property that realizes, e.g., the role of mass must therefore be mass.  Against this 
I argue that, given the possibility of certain symmetries in nomological role, properties 
simply cannot be individuated by their roles.  The second common argument against 
quidditism charges that quidditism implies a certain kind of epiphenomenalism.  This 
argument, I contend, confuses quidditism with quiddityism. 
 In Chapter Two I turn to the question of whether quidditism has any epistemic 
implications—in particular, whether it has any skeptical implications.  Here I develop and 
defend David Lewis’s posthumous ‘Ramseyan Humility’ (2008), where Lewis argues for 
quiddistic skepticism.  My discussion here is aimed at getting clear on exactly what 
quiddistic skepticism is, why Lewis thinks quiddistic skepticism follows from quidditism, 
and how quiddistic skepticism differs from more familiar types of skepticism.  The last of 
these is especially important, as several philosophers have charged that quiddistic 
skepticism is akin to traditional skepticism about the external world (and can be refuted as 
such).  I argue that this is not the case. 
 In Chapter Three, the final chapter, I turn to the question of whether quiddistic 
skepticism has any practical significance.  But I do so only within the context of a much 
larger discussion.  Chapter Three is really a general discussion of the practical significance 
of all types of skepticism and thus ought to be of interest even to those epistemologists who 
couldn’t care less about quidditism.  My strategy in this chapter is to first make two, cross-
cutting, mutually exclusive and exhaustive distinctions between types of skepticism.  I then 
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argue that skepticisms of only one of these types have practical implications.  As it 







QUIDDITISM WITHOUT QUIDDITIES 
 
 
Quidditism is roughly the idea that properties ‘come apart from’ their roles in the workings 
of nature.  More precisely, quidditism is the thesis that for some property P and its 
nomological role R, R might have been realized by some property other than P.  In this 
chapter I argue in favor of quidditism.   
My strategy begins by arguing against quidditism’s chief rival, dispositionalism, 
according to which properties are individuated by their roles in nature.8  I then defend 
quidditism against the common objection that it implies a kind of epiphenomenalism.  As a 
relative newcomer to the philosophical stage, there has been much confusion over what 
exactly quidditism implies, and a crucial part of my defense will be to clear-up some of this 
confusion. 
 This chapter addresses the debate over quidditism, a squarely metaphysical debate.  
Nonetheless, the topic here is directly relevant to a certain epistemological debate, and so it 
might be helpful to introduce the debate over quidditism via a brief discussion of the 
epistemological question.  Here the discussion will be quite brief, as the epistemological 
issue surrounding quidditism is the central topic of Chapter Two. 
 
                                                
8 As we’ll see, quidditism and dispositions are not strictly speaking ‘rivals’: while dispositionalism is a view 
about how properties are individuated, quidditism is a view about whether properties and their nomological 
roles are necessarily connected.  These two questions are closely related, but it will be important to see that 
they are not the same question. 
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Section One: Knowledge, Possibility, and Quidditism 
Upon arriving home, I come to have overwhelming evidence that a dog got into the kitchen 
trash.  However, there are two dogs that live in my house—Tolstoy and Cyrus—and I do 
not have evidence that tells me which dog committed the crime.  Hence, I know that some 
dog got into the trash without knowing which dog got into the trash. 
 The lesson I want to take from this little example is that in some sense knowing is a 
matter of being able to rule-out mere possibilities.9  There are at least two possibilities 
concerning which dog got into the trash: the possibility that Tolstoy got into the trash and 
the possibility that Cyrus got into the trash.  Let us assume that, in fact, Tolstoy got into the 
trash.  Not having evidence that rules-out the merely possible—that is, the possibility that 
Cyrus got into the trash—in favor of the possible and actual—that is, the possibility that 
Tolstoy got into the trash—I don’t know which possibility obtains—that is, I don’t know 
which dog got into the trash. 
 Now consider an analogous case.  Suppose someone, let’s call him ‘Newton’, gets 
bopped on the head by an apple.  After much observation, thought, and testing, he comes to 
know that there is some property, he decides to call it ‘mass’, that makes objects resist 
acceleration and attract one another.10  Question: does Newton thereby know which 
property makes objects resist acceleration and attract one another?  As in the case of the 
dogs, it seems that he does not: knowing is a matter of ruling-out the merely possible and, 
for all that’s been said so far, Newton does not have any evidence that rules-out the merely 
                                                
9 There are of course many controversies surrounding this assumption.  Which possibilities need to be ruled-
out?  What does it take to ‘rule-out’ a possibility?  What are possibilities?  I can’t go into these controversies 
here, but note that as long as we’re willing to be flexible enough about the answers to these further questions, 
almost everyone should be happy accepting the assumption. 
10 More accurately: Newton comes to know that there is some property that makes objects resist acceleration 
in proportion to the amount of it they have and attract one another in proportion to the product of the amounts 
of it they have divided by the square of the distance between them.  But for short, I’ll just say he discovers 
that there is some property that makes objects resist acceleration and attract one another. 
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possible—that is, the possibilities that might have but do not obtain—concerning which 
property makes objects resist acceleration and attract one another. 
But not so fast: are there mere possibilities in this case?  Or is the property that 
actually make objects resist acceleration and attract one another the only property that 
could have made objects resist acceleration and attract one another?11  The view that says 
there are mere possibilities is called: 
 
Quidditism. For any property P and its nomological role R, R might have been 
realized by a property other than P. 
 
Let me make a few comments on this definition of ‘quidditism’. 
 
First comment.  As I argued in the introduction, I hope this definition captures the 
spirit, if not the letter of Robert Black’s (2000) definition, which appears to be the 
first explicit definition of ‘quidditism’ in the literature.12  Please see the 
Introduction for a thorough discussion of why I opt for the above definition rather 
than Black’s. 
 
                                                
11 There is a third possibility here, and it’s one that anti-realists will have a strong affinity for.  This is the 
possibility that there is no property that realizes the role in question, or, perhaps, it is simply meaningless to 
talk about their being such a property.  I do not take this to be an entirely implausible view.  Nevertheless, the 
debate between realists and anti-realists about whether there are properties that realize the roles described by 
our scientific theories will not be my concern here. 
12 David Armstrong (1989, p.59) uses, but does not explicitly define the term ‘quidditism’.  However, the 
context makes it fairly clear that he takes quidditism to be the thesis that properties have quiddities.  I briefly 
discussed this thesis in the introduction and I will be discussing it at length below.  An interesting side note: 
W.V.O. Quine’s Quiddity: An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary (1989) contains no entry for ‘quiddity’ 
nor ‘quidditism’. 
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Second comment.  What do I mean by a property’s ‘nomological role’?  Take for 
instance mass.  Supposing we live in a Newtonian world, the complete statement of 
the natural laws of our world will contain conjuncts such as ‘massive objects resist 
acceleration in such and such way’ and ‘massive objects attract one another in such 
and such a way’.  To define the nomological role of mass, we replace each 
occurrence of the term ‘mass’ in the complete statement of the laws with a free 
variable.  This will give us an open sentence which contains conjuncts such as 
‘objects that have x resist acceleration in such and such a way’ and ‘objects that 
have x attract one another in such and such a way’.  The nomological role of mass 
is the role of being the property x such that objects that have x resist acceleration in 
such and such a way and objects that have x attract one another in such and such a 
way... and so on.  The nomological role of mass is thus a certain second-order 
property had by the first-order property mass. 
 
Third comment.  Quidditism, as I have defined it, is the thesis that a given 
nomological role is contingently realized by a given property.  As I make clear in 
the Introduction, this is distinct from the thesis that a given property contingently 
realizes its nomological role. 13  The latter thesis, I take it, is what some people 
mean when they say that the laws of nature are contingent.  To see that this thesis is 
not equivalent to quidditism, consider the nomological role actually realized by 
mass, and suppose that this role might have been realized by some property distinct 
from mass, let’s call it ‘schmass’.  If so, then the nomological role actually realized 
                                                
13 David Lewis seems to think otherwise when he writes ‘…do such properties as these have their 
nomological or causal roles essentially?  If so, as has been suggested by Shoemaker and by Swoyer, then a 
property with the nomological role of a certain quark colour would have to be that quark colour…’ (1986, p. 
162.)  As the remainder of the above paragraph attempts to demonstrate, the inference in the second sentence 
here is fallacious.  If I’m right about this, then the argument that Lewis is giving at p. 162 of (1986) against 
linguistic ersatzism is actually premised on quidditism, not the contingency of natural laws. 
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by mass is contingently realized by mass, and so quidditism is true.  However, this 
is consistent with mass necessarily realizing its nomological role.  All that’s 
required for the latter to be the case is that in any possible world where there is 
mass, mass realizes the same nomological role that it actually realizes. 
 An analogy might help.  The claim that the role of being the U.S. president 
in 2001 is contingently realized by George W. Bush is not equivalent to the claim 
that George W. Bush contingently realizes the role of being the U.S. president in 
2001.  Al Gore might have been the U.S. president in 2001.  This means that the 
role of being the U.S. president in 2001 is contingently realized by George W. 
Bush.  However, this is consistent with the claim that George W. Bush is 
necessarily the U.S. president in 2001.  All that’s required for the latter to be the 
case is that in any possible world where George W. Bush exists, George W. Bush is 
the U.S. president in 2001.14 
 
Some philosophers object to quidditism on anti-realist grounds.15  In this chapter, however, 
I will be concerned merely with the domestic dispute amongst those who think there really 
are properties that realize the nomological roles.  Amongst realists, there are two common 
objections to quidditism: the argument from property individuation—which is premised on 
quidditism’s chief rival, dispositionalism—and the epiphenomenalism argument.  The 
remainder of this paper defends quidditism by first arguing against dispositionalism and 
then arguing that the epiphenomenal argument confuses quidditism with a view I call 
‘quiddityism’.  Quidditityism is the view that properties have quiddities or inner natures, 
and is not, I argue, equivalent to nor even implied by quidditism.16 
 
                                                
14 In any case, that is how I am using the phrase ‘A is necessarily/contingently B’. 
15 See note 9. 
16 Again, the Introduction contains a brief discussion of quiddityism. 
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Section Two:  Dispositionalism 
Realists who reject quidditism often do so on the basis of a certain view about how 
properties are individuated.  That view is called 
 
Dispositionalism:  What it is for an object to have a given property P is just for it to 
have a certain disposition—namely, that disposition which is law-like associated 
with P. 
 
Dispositionalism is a popular thesis these days.  Its defenders, to name just a few, include 
Rom Harré and E. H. Madden (1975), Sydney Shoemaker (1984), Brian Ellis (2001), and 
George Molnar (2003).17 
The argument from dispositionalism against quidditism is fairly straightforward.  
According to dispositionalism, to have mass just is to be disposed to resist acceleration and 
attract other objects with mass; to have positive charge just is to be disposed to attract 
objects with negative charge, repel objects with positive charge, and so on.  So which 
properties might have realized the nomological role of mass?  Answer: only that property 
which is the disposition to attract objects with mass and resist acceleration—i.e., mass.  
Any other property (that is, any other disposition), would either dispose objects to do things 
incompatible with realizing the nomological role of mass or else not dispose them to do 
things required by realizing the nomological role of mass.  If this is so, then quidditism is 
false. 
Unfortunately, dispositionalism is an untenable thesis, or so I shall argue.  My 
argument will proceed in two steps.  In section four, I show that the only plausible version 
of dispositionalism is something I call ‘ramsified dispositionalism’.  Then, in section five, I 
                                                
17 Chris Swoyer (1982) is often grouped with the other papers on this list.  But it seems to me that his paper is 
better seen as either a defense of ‘ramsefied dispositionalism’ (section three of this paper), or ‘quasi-
dispositionalism’ (section five). 
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develop and defend an argument suggested by Denis Robinson (1993) as an argument 
against ramsified dispositionalism.  But first, let me briefly discuss two of the more popular 
arguments against dispositionalism, and why I think they are unsuccessful.  
 
Section Three: Two Standard Arguments against Dispositionalism 
There are several arguments against dispositionalism to be found in the literature.  Two of 
these, however, stand out as the most often repeated. 
Always Packing/Never Traveling.  David Armstrong (1984) and C.B. Martin (1993) 
offer what they call the ‘always packing/never traveling’ argument against 
dispositionalism.18  According to the argument, dispositionalism implies that ‘nothing ever 
happens’.  The idea is that if all properties are dispositions, then when a disposition is 
manifested, the manifestation itself is just a change in disposition.  But mere changes in 
dispositions are not genuine events (‘travellings’); rather, they are mere changes in what 
could or would happen under certain conditions—they are something’s getting ready to 
happen (‘packings’).  
This objection seems to me either unsound or, at best, question-begging.  When a 
flower becomes brittle upon being submerged in liquid nitrogen, surely something happens: 
the flower becomes brittle.  Perhaps the response will be that the flower cannot just become 
brittle: this change in disposition is ‘grounded in’, say, a change in molecular structure, 
which, the response claims, is a non-dispositional change.  This response has two problems.  
First, even if it is true that changes in dispositions must be ‘grounded in’ changes of non-
dispositions, this does not show that changes in disposition are not themselves genuine 
events.19  Second, this response begs the question against the dispositionalist by assuming 
that changes in dispositions must be ‘grounded in’ changes of non-dispositions.  Since the 
                                                
18 See also Armstrong (2000), (2005) and Martin (1997). 
19 See Mellor (1974, pp. 172 – 173) 
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dispositionalist flatly denies the existence of non-dispositional properties, she can hardly be 
expected to accept this assumption. 
 Out of Epistemic Reach.  The always packing/never traveling argument has a close 
connection to (and perhaps its roots in) Richard Swinburne’s (1980) epistemological 
argument against dispositionalism.20  Swinburne argues that if dispositionalism were true, 
then we would never be able to recognize the presence of a given property.  The central 
premise of his argument is that we can recognize the presence of a disposition only if we 
can recognize the typical manifestations of that disposition.  Since these manifestations, 
according to dispositionalism, are just changes in dispositions, we can recognize these 
manifestations only if we can recognize their typical manifestations, and so on.  According 
to Swineburne, the resulting regress is vicious.  
I don’t challenge the assumption that the resulting regress is vicious.  However, I do 
challenge the central premise of the argument.  Consider the property red.  Suppose it is 
correct, as some philosophers claim, that to be red is to be disposed to reflect light of such 
and such wavelength under such and such conditions.  Does it follow from this that one 
cannot recognize when an object is red unless one can recognize when an object reflects 
light of such and such wavelength under such and such conditions?  Clearly not.  Consider 
a child who, upon being appeared to redly, attributes redness to a certain object.  He does 
not have the ability to recognize that the object is reflecting light of such and such 
wavelength under such and such conditions, but he does have the ability to recognize that 
the object is red.  The lesson is this: disposition recognition does not always happen via 
manifestation recognition; sometimes it happens, so to speak, more directly. 
 The preceding arguments deserve much more attention than I have space to give 
them here, as there are no doubt moves that could be made on their behalf.  If these moves 
are successful, then the argument I present over the course of the next two sections should 
                                                
20 In fact, the two arguments are sometimes confused for one another.  See, for example, Max Kistler (2002, 
p. 77, footnote 19). 
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be seen as offering an independent reason to reject dispositionalism.  Nevertheless, I hope 
to have said enough to at least make it plausible that there is a need for a better argument 
against dispositionalism.  That is what I plan to offer. 
 
Section Four: From Dispositionalism to Ramsified Dispositionalism 
Many properties have lawful relations with, roughly speaking, themselves.  Suppose we 
live in a Newtonian world.  If so, then mass lawfully disposes objects to resist acceleration 
and attract other objects with mass.  On the dispositionalist view, mass thus simply is the 
disposition to resist acceleration and attract other objects with mass (in accordance with 
Newton’s laws).  But there is a circularity here.  If mass is the disposition to resist 
acceleration and attract other objects with mass, then really mass is the disposition to resist 
acceleration and attract other objects with… what?  Answer: the disposition to resist 
acceleration and attract other objects with… what? Answer: the disposition to resist 
acceleration and attract other objects with… and so on. 
 Is this circularity vicious?  To see that it is, suppose we have two objects with mass 
that attract one another.  Why did they attract?  The obvious answer is that having mass 
disposes objects to do so.  But is this answer available to the dispositionalist?  It doesn’t 
seem so: the dispositionalist can say only that each of these objects has the disposition to 
resist acceleration and attract other objects with… well, with what?  The non-
dispositionalist can say ‘mass’ and leave it at that.  But the dispositionalist cannot stop 
there—for him, mass is the disposition to resist acceleration and attract other objects with 
the disposition to resist acceleration and attract other objects with the disposition to resist 
acceleration and attract other objects with…  So again, why do these two objects with mass 
attract?  The dispositionalist cannot say.  Thus, the circle implied by dispositionalism is a 
vicious one, because it makes certain paradigm cases of physical explanation unavailable. 
 But the game is not up for the dispositionalist.  Long ago Frank Ramsey (1929) 
taught us what to do when faced with such a circle, a method which now bears his name: 
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we ramsify.  Rather than say that what it is to have mass is, in part, to have the disposition 
to attract other objects with mass, we should say that what it is to have mass is to have the 
property P such that objects with P are disposed to attract other objects with P (and do 
whatever else it is that object with mass are law-like disposed to do). 
Notice that ramsified dispositionalism has an answer to the question ‘Why did these 
two objects with mass attract?’  These two objects attract, on her view, because they both 
have the property P such that objects with P are disposed to attract other objects with P 
(and do whatever else it is that objects with mass are law-like disposed to do). 
There is a sense in which ramsified dispositionalism is not dispositionalism at all: 
properties on this view are not identified with dispositions.  Nonetheless, this view captures 
the spirit of dispositionalism: properties are individuated exclusively by the dispositions 
they confer.  In fact, many so-called dispositionalists are more plausibly read as ramsified 
dispositionalists.21  In any case, what I take the above argument to show is that 
dispositionalists would be wise to be ramsified dispositionalists. 
 
Section Five: The Symmetry Argument against Ramsified Dispositionalism 
In the previous section I argued that the only plausible version of dispositionalism is 
ramsified dispositionalism.  In this section I argue that ramsified dispositionalism must be 
rejected. 
In (1993), Denis Robinson’s writes 
 
[M]y doubts about Shoemaker/Swoyerism are fuelled by the following kind of case. 
It seems perfectly possible that there should be a pair of fundamental natural 
properties f and g differing not at all in their interactions with all other properties, 
but only in their interactions with one another. Suppose particles could acquire 
these properties in well-defined circumstances, with a 50% chance of getting either, 
                                                
21  See in particular Swoyer (1982), Shoemaker (1998), and Max Kistler (2002). 
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and suppose that if two particles both have f, or both have g, they repel each other, 
whereas if they have one of each they attract each other. 
Now the idea that we should identify properties if they satisfy the same laws 
looks in danger of being unable to deal with this case. Such a condition looks 
vacuous if we're allowed to assume we can first identify one of these properties and 
then use the laws to distinguish the other one from it. In other words, it just looks 
circular if we can presuppose identification of f in order to characterize the nomic 
profile of g, and vice versa… But if we consider the laws in a Ramseyfied form, 
and put in an existentially quantified variable for each of these properties, the 
Ramseyfied laws for each of them will show a pair of identical nomic profiles. Thus 
what distinguishes them is not their differing nomic profiles.  (pp. 23 – 4)22 
 
In Robinson’s example (presumably inspired by the case of positive charge and negative 
charge),23 f confers the disposition to attract objects with g and repel other objects with f 
and g confers the disposition to attract objects with f and repel objects with g.  Thus, 
according to ramsified dispositionalism, 
 
To have f is to have the property x such that objects with x are disposed to attract 
objects with g and repel objects with x. 
 
                                                
22  Armstrong (2000, p. 9) presents a similar argument but a bit more abstractly. 
23 The say the example is ‘inspired by’ the case of positive and negative charge.  Could it actually be the case 
of positive and negative charge?  That depends.  First, some alleged ‘non-fundamental’ laws seem to describe 
asymmetric roles for positive and negative charge.  One such law is that a glass rod becomes positively 
charged when rubbed with cat fur.  Of course, one could reject this argument by rejecting such alleged laws 
as not really laws.  But, second, even if one holds that only the absolute most fundamental laws are genuine 
laws, the jury is simply still out on whether positive and negative charge are symmetric at that level—or so 
I’m told.  (I am indebted to Carl Hoefer for the cat fur example.) 
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To have g is to have the property x such that objects with x are disposed to attract 
objects with f and repel objects with x. 
 
Just as in the last section, there is a kind of circularity here.  John Hawthorne (2001), 
however, argues that the circularity can be avoided if we define the two properties together. 
 
We avoided circularities in the functional analysis of belief and desire in the 
philosophy of mind by defining belief and desire together.  Perhaps we can the 
same in the functional analysis of properties… [Conjoin the sentences for the laws 
governing all the relevant properties.]  Replace each property name by a distinct 
variable (F1… Fn) and prefix each variable by an [existential] quantifier… Call this 
the Ramsified lawbook.  We can now articulate [Ramsified dispositionalism] very 
easily, and whatever its merits, we cannot be accused of vicious circularity.  Since 
the variable F1 replaced A, we can [say that to have A is to have the F1 such that…, 
where ‘…’ is replaced by the open sentence you get by dropping the existential 
quantifier prefixing ‘F1’]. (pp. 369 – 370) 
 
In our case, Hawthorne’s idea is as follows.  We first conjoin the sentences that express the 
laws for f and g. 
 
1.  Objects with f attract objects with g and repel objects with f, and objects with g 
attract objects with f and repel objects with g. 
 
We then replace ‘f’ and ‘g’ with variables and prefix existential quantifiers. 
 
2.  There exists a property x and there exists a property y such that objects with x 
attract objects with y and repel objects with x, and objects with y attract objects 
with x and repel objects with y. 
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We can now get a non-circular answer to our question: what is it to have f?  Ramsified 
dispositionalism can say that to have f is to have  
 
3.  The property x such that there exists a property y such that objects with x attract 
objects with y and repel objects with x, and objects with y attract objects with x 
and repel objects with y. 
 
But here’s the rub: what happens when we ask what is it to have the property g?  Ramsified 
dispositionalism, on Hawthorne’s proposal, will say that to have g is to have 
 
4.  The property y such that there exists a property x such that objects with x attract 
objects with y and repel objects with x, and objects with y attract objects with x 
and repel objects with y. 
 
which is perfectly equivalent to (3).  So what is it to have g on the ramsified dispositionalist 
account?  Exactly what it is to have f, and so to have g is to have f and to have f is to have 
g!  But that cannot be right: objects with f repel objects with f and attract objects with g.  
Hence, there must be a distinction between having f and having g and so ramsified 
dispositionalism, which seems to imply that there is no such distinction, must be false.24 
                                                
24 Might the ramsified dispositionalist build more than dispositions into the individuation of properties?  
Allan Gibbard wondered in conversation whether the ramsified dispositionalist might build facts about 
location into the individuation of properties.  If so, then the ramsified dispositionalist has a way of 
distinguishing the two properties f and g, since f and g are, we will assume, instantiated at different locations 
(just as positive charge is instantiated at the nuclei of atoms while negative charge is not).  However, the price 
he pays for being able to make this distinction is clearly too high: his view now entails that f and g could not 
have been instantiated at any locations other than the locations at which they are in fact instantiated. 
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In considering Robinson’s version of the symmetry argument, Black (2000) writes 
in a footnote that even if the argument is sound, it does not follow that f might have 
realized g’s roles or vice versa.  Black’s point here is that Robinson’s argument does not 
directly imply quidditism.  I agree: the symmetry argument does not imply that f might 
have realized g’s role,25 and so it does not directly imply quidditism.  But we must keep in 
mind what the symmetry argument is here intended to establish.  It is here intended merely 
as a refutation of ramsified dispositionalism, which, by the argument of the last section, is 
the only plausible version of dispositionalism, which, as I noted above, forms the major 
premise of perhaps the most common argument against quidditism.  What the argument of 
this section seeks to show is merely that properties cannot be individuated solely by their 
nomological roles.  If that’s right, then ramsified dispositionalism is false, and a common 
reason for rejecting quidditism is unsound. 
 
Section Six: Quasi-dispositionalism 
Note that the symmetry argument does not force us to give-up the idea that properties are 
partly individuated by their nomological roles.  Might we then argue against quidditism on 
the grounds that part of what it is to have a given property P is to have a certain 
disposition?  In this section I’ll argue that we cannot. 
Let us call the proposed view of properties 
 
                                                
25 In fact, it doesn’t seem possible for f to realize g’s role (or vice versa).  The role of g is being the property x 
such that objects with x attract objects with f and repel objects with x.  Hence, if f realized g’s role, then f 
would be such that objects with f attract objects with f and repelled objects with f.  Is this possible?  It 
depends on what we mean when we say that x’s attract/repel y’s.  If we mean that the net force between x’s 
and y’s in virtue of their being x’s and y’s is one of attraction/repulsion, then it is not possible for f’s to both 
attract and repel f’s. 
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Quasi-Dispositionalism:  Part of what it is for an object to have a given property P 
is for it to have a certain disposition—namely the disposition that is law-
like associated with P.26 
 
Armstrong (2005) and others refer to such a view of properties as a ‘two-sided view’, 
referring to the dispositional part of a property on the one hand, and whatever else makes 
up the property on the other.  C. B. Martin’s (1993), (1997) view of properties is quasi-
dispositionalism: 
 
The dream of either a purely qualitative, non-dispositional or a purely dispositional 
account of properties is philosophical fantasy. No property is in “pure act”, free of 
all unfulfilled potency unless it is a property of God (or perhaps the number 2). And 
no property is only its capacity for the production of further capacities… 
It is my suggestion that the properties of entities that are constitutive of any 
state of affairs must be qualitative as well as dispositional, and dispositional as well 
as qualitative. (1997: 215 – 6)27 
 
On the quasi-dispositionalist view, to have a certain property is to have a certain disposition 
and a certain ‘qualitative nature’.   
Quasi-dispositionalism seems to have the resources to avoid the symmetry 
argument of the last section.  Let Qf be the qualitative nature that partly constitutes the 
property f and let Qg be the qualitative nature that partly constitutes the property g.  The 
quasi-dispositionalist can say that to have f is to have Qf and be disposed to attract objects 
                                                
26 For those of us who think that some parts are wholes, what I really mean by ‘part’ here is proper part. 
27 Just after this passage, Martin cites Martin (1994) as a paper where he (first?) puts forward this view of 
properties.  However, this seems to be incorrect.  The correct citation, I believe, is (1993).  But the confusion 
doesn’t end there.  In Martin (1993), Martin cites Martin (1984) as a paper where he ‘puts forward’ this view.  
But, as far as I can tell, there is no putting forward, nor even any mention, of such a view in Martin (1984). 
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with Qg and repel objects with Qf.  Similarly, to have g is to have Qg and be disposed to 
attract objects with Qf and repel objects with Qg.  There is no circularity here. 
However, unlike dispositionalism, quasi-dispositionalism does not motivate 
rejecting quidditism.  In fact, it seems to imply quidditism.  According to quasi-
dispositionalism, part but not all of what it is to have a certain property is to have a certain 
disposition.  The other part, at least on Martin’s two-sided view, is to have a certain 
‘qualitative nature’.  Consider the properties mass and positive charge.  On the two-sided 
view, to have mass is to have a certain disposition DM and a certain qualitative character 
QM, and to have positive charge is to have a disposition DPC and a certain qualitative 
character QPC.  Now, as Martin says, it is essential to having mass, on this view, that an 
object with mass has both DM and QM.  Moreover, assuming that objects have 
dispositions/qualitative characters only in virtue of having properties that are constituted by 
those dispositions/qualitative characters, it is also not possible to have QM without having 
some disposition and it is not possible to DM without having some qualitative nature.  
However, none of this precludes there being a property, call it ‘schmass’, that is a sort of 
recombination of the two halves of mass and positive charge.  More precisely, let schmass 
be such that to have schmass is to have the disposition DM and the qualitative character 
QPC.  Now, if objects could have had schmass rather than mass, then the nomological role 
of mass could have been realized a property other than mass, since that is exactly what 
schmass would have done.  In short, quasi-dispositionalism seems to imply quidditism. 
Whether one thinks that quasi-dispositionalism implies quidditism will depend on 
whether one accepts the principle that possibility is preserved under the sort of 
recombination mentioned in the previous paragraph.28 Of course, such a principle is not 
entailed by quasi-dispositionalism, and so quasi-dispositionalism does not entail 
quidditism.  Nevertheless, such a principle is clearly compatible with quasi-
dispositionalism and there doesn’t seem to be any reason to deny it: if the two sides of a 
                                                
28 See Armstrong (1989) for a discussion of similar principles of recombination. 
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property really are distinct sides (as opposed to being, say, distinct ways of conceiving one 
and the same thing), then it would seem that there might have been a property with some 
distinct recombination of sides.  As far as I know, no quasi-dispositionalists have argued 
against such a principle of recombination.29 
 Two sections back we saw that dispositionalism proper creates a kind of circularity 
that undermines certain paradigm cases of physical explanation.  One section back we saw 
that ramsified dispositionalism founders on the symmetry argument.  And in this section 
we saw that quasi-dispositionalism implies, or is at least compatible with quidditism.  If all 
that’s so, then there is no sound argument against quidditism from dispositionalism proper, 
ramsified dispositionalism, or quasi-dispositionalism.  This, as far as I know, is an 
exhaustive list of views on properties that might form the basis of an individuation 
argument against quidditism.  I turn now to defending quidditism against the 
epiphenomenalism argument. 
 
Section Seven: The Epiphenomenalism Argument 
Denis Robinson (1993), Max Kistler (2002), and Ann Whittle (2006) have all charged 
quidditism with implying a kind of epiphenomenalism.30  Each of these authors takes this 
as a reason—perhaps not a conclusive reason—to reject quidditism.31  I should admit at the 
outset that I’m not sure I fully understand how Robinson, Kistler, and Whittle intend the 
epiphenomenalism argument to go.  Nevertheless, I shall try my best to capture what these 
                                                
29 Not, at least, while still maintaining quasi-dispositionalism.  Martin (1997) appears to ultimately abandon 
the quasi-dispositionalism of Martin (1993) in favor of a view according to which properties have only one 
side, which can be conceived either as disposition or quality.  John Heil (2004) defends a similar view. 
30 Robinson, the first to charge quidditism with epiphenomenalism, derived his argument by generalizing an 
argument from Lewis (1990) against qualia theory.  A related argument against qualia theory appears in 
Lewis (1995). 
31 Robinson in particular seems to think that there are even stronger reasons to reject anti-quidditism in favor 
of quidditism. 
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authors meant and make the argument as plausible as I can.  As we’ll see, I have some 
stake in their being at least something right about the epiphenomenalism argument, and so I 
can hardly be accused of not playing fair. 
Here is how I think the argument goes.  All parties are agreed that P has (at least 
contingently) the property of realizing such and such nomological role.  Now suppose that 
the event C of some object’s having P causes some event E.  All parties are agreed (we’ll 
assume) that C causes E in virtue of the fact that P realizes a certain nomological role—that 
is, in virtue of the fact that P has the second-order property of realizing such and such 
nomological role.  Hence, that second-order property is not epiphenomenal in the following 
sense: the fact that P has the property of realizing such and such nomological role is 
explanatorily relevant to the occurrence of E. 
But, goes the argument, if properties are not wholly individuated by their 
nomological roles, then properties must have some other second-order property in virtue of 
which they are individuated: an inner nature.  Author’s typically refer to this ‘inner nature’ 
as a property’s quiddity.  Now what about quiddities?  Is P’s quiddity explanatory relevant 
to the occurrence of E.  It seems not: there is no need whatsoever to mention the fact that P 
has a certain quiddity in the explanation of the event E.  Hence, the argument concludes, 
quidditism implies that properties have epiphenomenal second-order properties—namely, 
quiddities. 
Is this implication of epiphenomenalism a reason to reject quidditism?  It surely 
isn’t a decisive reason.  Nevertheless, it seems to me that, all other things being equal, a 
view that does not imply epiphenomenalism is to be preferred to one that does.  So I 
suggest we think of the epiphenomenalism argument at intended to show this much: all 
other things being equal, we ought to prefer some alternative to quidditism.  If what I’ve 
said in the last several sections is correct, all other things are probably not equal between 
quidditism and its alternatives: dispositionalism and ramsified dispositionalism have 
serious problems, and quasi-dispositionalism is not an alternative to quidditism at all.  
Nevertheless, it would be good to deal with the epiphenomenalism argument on its own 
 34 
terms, to see if it even establishes what it is intended to establish.  What I’ll argue in the 
final section of this paper is that it does not: it merely establishes that, all other things being 
equal, we ought to prefer one version of quidditism to another. 
 
Section Eight: Haecceitism without Haecceities, Quidditism without Quiddities 
The epiphenomenalism argument rests squarely on the claim that quidditism requires 
quiddities.  And this is precisely where I shall resist the argument. 
 It seems that most philosophers have (implicitly) assumed that quidditism requires 
quiddities.  More precisely, philosophers have assumed that if supervenience fails in either 
direction—properties fail to supervene on their roles or roles fail to supervene on 
properties—then properties must have quiddities.32  Here is Jonathan Schaffer (2005): 
 
A quiddity is the “suchness” of a property. It is its intrinsic nature. If a property 
such as charge confers different powers at different worlds, then what unifies these 
                                                
32 In addition to Schaffer (2005), this assumption is more or less transparent in Robinson (1992), Hawthorne 
(2001), and Whittle (2006).  Hawthorne (2001), however, says in footnote 5 that he is “not requiring of the 
‘quidditist’ that he be ontologically serious about quiddities, considered as something metaphysically distinct 
from the properties themselves.”  That, I think, is the right thing to say.  But, given this qualification, one 
wonders why Hawthorne ever attributes quiddities to the quidditist in the first place.  I think it is because he 
wants to use what he sees as ‘the best case for thinking that a property’s causal profile exhausts its nature’ as 
an argument against quidditism (p. 368).  The case that Hawthorne makes may or may not be the case under 
consideration here.  Nowhere does he use the term ‘epiphenomenal’, but he does claim that ‘we don’t need 
quidditive extras to make sense of the world’ and that ‘science seems to offer no conception of negative 
charge over and above “the thing that plays the charge role”’.  Be that as it may, my response to this argument 
is the same as my response to the epiphenomenalism argument: we have here an argument against quidditism 
only if quidditism requires ‘quidditive extras’.  If, as Hawthorne allows, the quidditist ‘need not be 
ontologically serious above quiddities, considered as something metaphysically distinct from the properties 
themselves’, then we do not here have a case against quidditism, for surely Hawthorne is not claiming that 
Science can do without negative charge itself. 
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instances as many instances of one property is their quiddity, their common nature. 
A quiddity is in some ways… analogous to a haecceity, understood as the 
“thisness” of an individual. (endnote 2) 
 
I believe it’s a mistake to think that quidditism requires quiddities.  To see why, let’s take a 
moment to consider the analogy between quidditism and haecceitism.   
As I said back in section one, quidditism is often introduced on analogy with 
haecceitism,33 and I have chosen my definition of ‘quidditism’ to be as analogous as 
possible to Lewis’s (1986) definition of ‘haecceitism’.  Lewis defines ‘haecceitism’ as the 
view that representation de re by possible worlds does not supervene on qualitative 
representation by possible worlds.  More intuitively, and accurately enough for our 
purposes here, Lewis defines ‘haecceitism’ as the view that the world might have been just 
like it is qualitatively and yet might have differed with respect to which individuals had 
which qualities.34  So, for example, the world might have been just as it is qualitatively and 
yet someone besides me might have had all the qualities that I in fact have.   
To see the analogy between quidditism on my definition and haecceitism on 
Lewis’s definition, think of nomological roles as analogous to qualitative characters and 
properties as analogous to individuals.  Where haecceitism on Lewis’s definition is the 
view that one and the same qualitative character might have been had by an individual 
distinct from the individual that actually has it, quidditism on my definition is the view that 
one and the same nomological role might have been realized by a property distinct from the 
property that actually realizes it. 
 Lewis goes at lengths to distinguish haecceitism from some nearby views.  In 
particular, he distinguishes haecceitism from the view that individuals have haecceities—
                                                
33 See inter alia Armstrong (1989), Black (2000), Schaffer (2005), and Lewis (2008). 
34 Strictly speaking, Lewis does not define haecceitism as the view that our world might have… Rather, he 
defines haecceitism as the view that some world might have…  The difference between these definitions need 
not concern us here. 
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that is, primitive thisnesses in virtue of which individuals are individuated.  Lewis contends 
that haecceitism does not entail that individuals have haecceities.  This is precisely 
analogous to my contention that quidditism does not entail that properties have 
quiddities—primitive suchnesses.  In the Introduction I defined ‘quiddityism’ as the view 
that properties have quiddities.  My contention, then, is that quidditism can be had without 
quiddityism, just as haecceitism can be had without what we might call ‘haecceityism’. 
 Why would anyone have thought that haecceitism requires haecceities?  Here is one 
possible explanation.  Suppose you thought that individuals were exhaustively constituted 
by their properties—that is, suppose you accepted the so-called ‘bundle theory’ of 
individuals.35  In that case, it would seem to you that haecceitism requires haecceities: if 
two distinct bundles of properties (that is, individuals) share all the same qualitative 
properties, then they must differ with respect to some non-qualitative thisness.   
However, one need not (and I take this to be Lewis’ point in saying that haecceitism 
can be had without haecceities) accept such a view of individuals.  Suppose you think of 
individuals as simple, so that they are not constituted by anything.  In that case, you’ll think 
of facts about individuation of individuals as brute, and so you won’t acknowledge any 
properties in virtue of which individuals are individuated.  Hence, haecceitism can be had 
without haecceities. 
 Similarly, why would anyone have thought that quidditism requires quiddities?  
Here’s one possible explanation.  Suppose you thought of properties as exhaustively 
constituted by their second-order properties.  Such a view has no name, but let’s dub it the 
‘bundle theory of properties’.  In that case, it would seem to you that quidditism requires 
quiddities: if two distinct bundles of second-order properties (that is, properties) share all 
the same role-concerning second-order properties, then they must differ with respect to 
some non-role-involving suchness. 
                                                
35 See inter alia James Van Cleve (1985) and Ted Sider (2006) for discussions of the bundle theory. 
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However, one need not (and this is my point in saying that quidditism does not 
require quiddities) accept such a view of properties.  Suppose you think of properties as 
simple, so they are not constituted by anything.  In that case, you’ll think of facts about 
individuation of properties as brute, and so you won’t acknowledge any second-order 
properties in virtue of which properties are individuated.  Hence, quidditism can be had 
without quiddities. 
 A second-order identity property is a property that, necessarily, one and only one 
property has.  Does the fact that quidditism can be had without quiddities—primitive 
second-order identity properties in virtue of which properties are individuated—imply that 
quidditism can be had without second-order identity properties?  In a sense ‘yes’ and in a 
sense ‘no’; it depends on what we mean by ‘property’.   
In one sense of ‘property’, properties are cheap: any function from possible worlds 
to sets of individuals from that world is a first-order property, any function from possible 
worlds to sets of properties from that world is a second-order property, and so on.  In this 
sense of ‘property’, quidditism cannot be had without second-order identity properties:36 
for any property P you like, there is a function that takes any possible world and returns the 
singleton set of P if P exists at that world and returns the empty set if P does not exist at 
that world.  This function is the second-order identity property, in the cheap sense of 
‘property’, of P.  However, it seems that implying epiphenomenal properties in this cheap 
sense of ‘property’ is no reason at all to reject a theory: we should expect such cheap 
properties to be epiphenomenal. 
What’s important, I think, is whether a view implies that there are epiphenomenal 
properties in the more substantial sense of the term ‘property’.  There is no agreed upon 
definition of the more substantial sense of ‘property’, but we can characterize properties in 
this sense, roughly, as attributes or features of things.  Perhaps we can even go so far as to 
                                                
36 Just as haecceitism cannot be had without first-order identity properties, in the cheap sense of ‘property’.  
See Lewis (1986, p. 225). 
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say that they are those attributes in virtue of which things resemble one another.  Some 
think that these attributes are ‘universals’ (entities like squareness that are ‘wholly present’ 
at each of their instantiations), others think that they are sets of perfectly resembling 
‘tropes’ (entities like this squareness here that are present only at the unique place where 
they are instantiated), still others think that they are ‘abstract forms’ in which things 
‘participate’.37  These disagreements need not concern us here, provided that we have an 
intuitive idea of what a property in the substantial sense is.  Any view that posits the 
existence of epiphenomenal properties in this sense, it seems to me, is suspect.  As I said 
above, this isn’t a decisive reason to reject a theory, but, all other things being equal, we 
should prefer a theory that does not posit such entities. 
Haecceitism without haecceities does not require the existence of identity properties 
in the more substantial sense, while haecceitism with haecceities does.  Haecceities, recall, 
are second-order properties in virtue of which individuals are individuated.  If such 
properties do exist, they would seem to be properties in the substantial sense; otherwise, 
they wouldn’t be able to do the metaphysical work, so to speak, of individuating 
individuals.  But haecceitism without haecceities is consistent with the claim that identity 
properties are merely properties in the cheap sense.  According to haecceitism without 
haecceities, individuations between individuals are brute metaphysical facts—they do not 
hold in virtue of facts involving identity properties.  Hence, haecceitism without haecceities 
does not require identity properties to do any work in individuating the individuals, and so 
haecceitism without haecceities does not require that identity properties be properties in the 
substantial sense. 
Similarly, quidditism without quiddities does not require the existence of identity 
properties in the more substantial sense, while quidditism with quiddities does.  Quiddities, 
recall, are second-order properties in virtue of which properties are individuated.  If such 
properties do exist, they would seem to have to be properties in the substantial sense; 
                                                
37 See inter alia D. C. Williams (1953), Armstrong (1978), and Lewis (1983). 
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otherwise, they wouldn’t be able to do the metaphysical work, so to speak, of individuating 
properties.  But quidditism without quiddities is consistent with the claim that second-order 
identity properties are merely properties in the cheap sense.  According to quidditism 
without quiddities, individuations between properties are brute metaphysical facts—they 
do not hold in virtue of facts involving second-order identity properties.  Hence, quidditism 
without quiddities does not require identity properties to do any work in individuating the 
properties, and so quidditism without quiddities does not require that second-order identity 
properties be properties in the substantial sense.  Thus, the fact that second-order identity 
properties are epiphenomenal is no reason to reject quidditism without quiddities: as I said 
above, we should expect such cheap properties to be epiphenomenal. 
 
Looking Ahead 
This concludes my defense of quidditism.  In the next two chapters I will be asking, first, 
does quidditism imply a kind of skepticism about which properties realize which roles, and, 
second, what, if any, is the practical significance of this skepticism?  I’ll argue that the 









In the previous chapter I argued in favor of quidditism, the thesis that the nomological roles 
realized by properties in our world might have been realized by properties other than the 
ones that actually realize them.  In this chapter I will argue that quidditism, together with a 
certain plausible conceptual/semantic thesis, implies that there are certain facts about the 
world that we will never know—namely, facts about which properties realize the 
nomological roles.  Let’s call this skeptical thesis ‘quiddistic skepticism’. 
The argument I will be defending in this chapter is not my own.  It was originally 
put forth by David Lewis in his posthumously published paper ‘Ramseyan Humility’ 
(2008).  Of the three published responses to Lewis’s essay (Langton 2004; Schaffer 2005; 
Whittle 2006), each argues that even if we accept Lewis’s metaphysical assumption 
(quidditism), we need not accept his epistemic conclusion (quidditistic skepticism).  My 
aim in this chapter is to develop and defend Lewis’s argument against these critics. 
 Ann Whittle claims that the argument for quiddistic skepticism rests on an 
implausibly strong account of identification—namely, that to identify x, one must be able 
to distinguish x from all other actual and possible entities.  Accordingly, Whittle attempts 
to refute quiddistic skepticism by an appeal to a more lenient account of identification.  In 
what follows I defend Lewis by showing that Lewis’s demanding account of identification 
is a good account of at least one perfectly legitimate sense of ‘identification’. 
Jonathan Schaffer and Rae Langton each claim that quiddistic skepticism rests on 
an implausibly strong account of knowledge—namely, non-contextual infallibilism.  In this 
way they see quiddistic skepticism as akin to traditional, external-world skepticism.  
Accordingly, Schaffer and Langton attempt to refute quiddistic skepticism by appealing to 
more lenient epistemic principles.  In what follows I defend Lewis, not by defending non-
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contextual infallibilism, but by showing that even on the alternative epistemic principles of 
Schaffer and Langton, Lewis’s conclusion still follows.   
In this chapter an all-important difference between quiddistic and traditional, 
external-world skepticism will begin to emerge.  Here we will see that this difference has 
important implications for what it takes to refute one or the other of these skepticisms.  But 
in the next chapter we will see that this different also has important implications for which 
of these skepticisms has practical significance. 
 
Section One: The Argument for Quidditistic Skepticism 
In the Introduction I gave the following gloss on the argument for quiddistic skepticism. 
 
Empirical inquiry can tell us which nomological roles are realized, but if there are 
further facts about which properties realize those roles—that is, facts above and 
beyond the mere facts about which roles are realized—then those fact are beyond 
the realm of empirical inquiry.  Let us call these worrisome sorts of facts, if there 
are any, ‘quidditistic facts’.  Now according to quidditism, there are quidditistic 
facts, because quidditism is the view that properties ‘come apart from’ their roles.  
But quidditistic facts are contingent facts about our world and, hence, if they are 
beyond the realm of empirical inquiry, then they are simply unknowable. 
 
It’s time to turn this gloss into a proper argument.  I shall reconstruct Lewis’s argument in 
five stages. 
The Stage-setting Stage.  Let T be a true and complete final theory of our world.  
Lewis claims that the language of T can be divided into two parts: the terms that have 
meaning independently of T (the ‘O-terms’) and the terms that are implicitly defined by T 
(the ‘T-terms’).  Writing T as a single sentence and replacing the T-terms with variables, 
we get the realization formula of T—the open sentence ‘T(x1,x2,…,xn)’.  Any n-tuple of 
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properties that could have satisfied the realization formula of T is called a ‘possible 
realization of T’; any n-tuple of properties that does satisfy the realization formula of T is 
called an ‘actual realization of T’. 
To make this concrete, suppose (absurdly) that the final theory T is just the sentence 
‘Objects with mass attract one another’.  Now suppose that ‘mass’ is a term that is 
implicitly defined by this theory.  The realization formula of T is thus the open sentence 
‘Objects with x attract one another’.  Now suppose that, in fact, objects with property P 
attract one another.  Then <P> is the actual realization of T.  Now suppose that it could 
have been that objects with Q attract one another.  Then <Q> is a possible realization of T. 
The Metaphysical/Linguistic Stage.  Lewis assumes that there is a realization of T.  
He further assumes that if expressions of the O-language refer to the properties that realize 
T, it is only via descriptions of their nomological roles.38  Finally, Lewis assumes 
quidditism—the thesis that for any property P and its nomological role R, R might have 
been realized by a property other than P.39,40  Given these assumptions, it follows that, in 
                                                
38 Actually, Lewis assumes that if the O-language refers to the properties that realize T, it is only via 
descriptions of their nomological/locational roles in nature. 
39 Given what I said in footnote 38, what Lewis actually needs to assume here is something a bit stronger than 
quidditism—he needs the thesis that for any property P and it’s nomological/locational role R, R might have 
been realized by some property other than P.  But if we accept quidditism, I can’t see any reason to not accept 
this slightly stronger thesis. 
40 In fact, the definition of ‘quidditism’ cited by Lewis is not the one I have given here, but that of Black 
(2000).  Moreover, Lewis’s argument for the existence of a merely possible realization of T is not the one I 
have given here.  He actually gives two distinct arguments: the permutation argument and the argument from 
idlers/aliens.  The permutation argument says that given quidditism (on Black’s definition), any permutation 
of the actual realization of T (which respects their category and adicy) is a possible realization of T.  The 
argument from idlers/aliens says that given quidditism (on Black’s definition), T might have been realized by 
idlers--properties that are instantiated at our world but realize no nomological roles—or aliens—properties 
that are not instantiated at our world.   
But these arguments face some serious problems.  Both arguments face the problem that it is less 
than clear exactly what Black’s definition of ‘quidditism’ amounts to, whether it is acceptable, and whether it 
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addition to the actual realization of T, there is some merely possible realization of T. 
The Evidential Stage.  Lewis assumes that the O-language of T suffices to describe 
all possible observations.  Now consider the Ramsey sentence of T—
‘∃x1,x2,…,xnT(x1,x2,…,xn)’.  Since the Ramsey sentence of T implies all and only the O-
language sentences of T, it follows from the above assumption that for any possible world 
w such that the proposition expressed by the Ramsey sentence of T is true at w, w will 
never be eliminated by—that is, inconsistent with—our observational evidence.  From this 
and the conclusion of the metaphysical/linguistic stage it follows that there is some 
possibility in which T is realized that will never be eliminated by our evidence, and yet the 
properties that realize T in that possibility are not the properties that actually realize T. 
                                                
implies what Lewis here takes it to imply (see the Introduction).  Moreover, each argument faces its own 
special problem.   
The permutation argument has the problem that it must assume that T is uniquely realized in the 
actual world, or, somewhat weaker, that it is not actually realized by any permutations of one of its 
realizations.  But how is Lewis entitled to this assumption?  If ‘positive charge’ and ‘negative charge’ turn out 
to play perfectly symmetrical roles in the final theory, then if the final theory has a realization, it will also be 
realized by a permutation of that realization—namely, the one that swaps the properties satisfying the positive 
and negative charge roles.   
The argument from idlers/aliens faces a different sort of difficulty.  Here Lewis assumes that since 
we do not know that there are not idlers/aliens, it follows that we do not know that his argument does not 
establishes quidditistic skepticism (assuming for the moment that the rest of the argument is sound), and so 
we do not know which properties realize T (2008: 213 - 214).  The trouble here is that Lewis is assuming a 
sort of KK principle: if we do not know that we know which properties realize T, then we do not know which 
properties realize T.  But many accounts of knowledge violate that principle. In fact, Lewis’s own account of 
knowledge violates that principle (see the next paragraph).  What matters for knowing that P, on Lewis’s 
account, is not whether you know that your evidence eliminates all possibilities in which not-P, but, rather, 
that your evidence eliminates all possibilities in which not-P.  If there are no possibilities in which T is not 
realized by the actual realization(s) of T, then our evidence trivially eliminates all possibilities in which T is 
not realized by the actual realization(s) of T.  It then follows, on Lewis’s account of knowledge, that we know 
which properties realize T, even if we do not know that we know which properties realize T. 
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The Knowledge-that Stage.  Although Lewis doesn’t say so, the most 
straightforward way to get from the conclusion of the evidential stage to quidditistic 
skepticism is via Lewis’s own account of knowledge.  In (1999) Lewis defends the 
following infallibilist account of knowledge: S knows that P iff S’s evidence eliminates all 
possibilities in which not-P (psst!—see this note)41.  This analysis, together with the 
conclusion of the last stage of the argument, implies that we will never know p, where p is 
the proposition that is true at all and only those worlds where the actual realization of T is 
the realization of T.42 
The Knowledge-which Stage.  The final stage of the argument takes us from the 
claim that we will never know that p to the claim that we will never know which n-tuple of 
properties realizes T.  As in the last stage of the argument, Lewis leaves the key assumption 
here implicit, but the path seems clear.  We simply assume what Jonathan Schaffer (2007) 
calls the ‘Standard Analysis of knowing-wh’, according to which S knows-wh (who, which, 
what, etc) iff S knows P, where P is the true answer to the indirect question of the wh-
clause.  Assuming that p (from the previous stage) is the true answer to the question 
‘Which n-tuple of properties realizes T?’ it follows from the conclusion of the knowledge-
that stage that we will never know which n-tuple of properties realizes T. 
 
At the heart of this argument is quidditism, which I defended in Chapter One.  But Whittle, 
Schaffer, and Langton all argue that even if quidditism is correct, quiddistic skepticism 
does not follow. We have just seen that quiddistic skepticism does follow if we assume 
                                                
41 I here allows Lewis’s contextualist sotto voce proviso (“Psst!—except for the possibilities that we are 
properly ignoring”) to remain sotto voce.  As I argue below, the appeal to contextualism won’t help in 
blocking the argument for Humility. 
42 Here and henceforth I follow Lewis in assuming that propositions are sets of possible worlds (or, more 
generally, sets of possibilia).  No doubt much of what I say in this paper would need to be revised to take on 
the assumption that propositions are more finely individuated. 
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Lewis’s infallibilist account of knowledge and the standard account of knowing-wh.43 But 
Whittle, Schaffer, and Langton are by no means obliged to grant these accounts. After all, 
the account of knowledge is an infallibilist account and the account of knowing-wh, at least 
as it is used here, is a quite strong one.  Accordingly, we might have expected these 
accounts to imply some serious epistemic depravity. The interesting question, then, is 
whether quidditism implies quiddistic skepticism on more lenient epistemic principles. This 
is exactly the question that these authors address, and they all answer it in the negative. We 
will look at their arguments, and why I think they’re wrong, in a moment. For now, we 
must pause to clear something up. 
 
Section Two: Trivial Knowledge and Two-dimensions of Intension 
In the last section I argued that Lewis’s thesis that we will never know which properties 
realize T is equivalent to the thesis that we will never know p, where p is the proposition 
that is true at all and only those possible worlds where the actual realization of T is the 
realization of T.  Now this may seem a bit odd, for this is just the thesis that 
 
(1) We will never know that the actual realization of T is the realization of T. 
 
But how could (1) possibly be true?  What could be easier than knowing that the actual F is 
the F?  Which other F could it be?! 
This response hinges on an ambiguity in (1). The ambiguity concerns which 
proposition is expressed by the embedded sentence ‘the actual realization of T is the 
realization of T’. One way to understand the ambiguity is with the resources of ‘non-
                                                
43 More accurately: it follows if we the standard account of knowledge-wh and the invariantists version of 
Lewis’s infallibilism.  See note 39 above and section five below. 
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ambitious’ two-dimensional semantics.44 There are many versions of two-dimensional 
semantics, but only the general idea is needed here. This is the idea that at least some 
statements have two intensions: a C-intension and an A-intension.45 The A-intension of a 
statement, roughly, is the proposition that is true at all and only those worlds considered as 
actual where the statement is true (‘A’ for ‘actual’). The C-intension, on the other hand, is 
the proposition that is true at all and only those worlds considered as counterfactual where 
the statement is true (‘C’ for ‘counterfactual’). 
Let’s take an example. Consider the statement ‘The actual US president is the US 
president’. Now consider a world w1 where the US president is Al Gore. Is the statement 
‘The actual US president is the US president’ true at w1? Well, that depends on whether 
we’re considering w1 as actual or as counterfactual. Consider it first as counterfactual. In 
other words, ask yourself what would have been true had Al Gore been the US president. In 
particular, ask yourself if the actual US president would have been the US president. The 
answer, it seems, is ‘no’—the actual president, George W. Bush, would not have been the 
president had Al Gore been the president. But now consider w1 as actual. In other words, 
ask yourself what is true if Al Gore is the US president. In particular, ask yourself if the 
actual US president is the US president if Al Gore is the US president. The answer in this 
case, it seems, is ‘yes’. Thus, the A-intension and C-intension of ‘The actual US president 
is the US president’ are not identical: the former is true at w1 but the latter is not. 
                                                
44. The ‘nonambitious’ qualifier on two-dimensional semantics comes from Soames 2005.  The two-
dimensionalism appealed to here is non-ambitious in that it claims only that some statements (in particular, 
those containing the term “actually”) have two intensions (please see the next note). 
45. The labels ‘C-intension’ and ‘A-intension’ are the ones used by Frank Jackson in his particular version of 
two-dimensional semantics (inter alia, Jackson 1998). In other versions, different labels have been used. My 
choice to use Jackson’s labels should not be taken as an endorsement of his particular view of two-
dimensional semantics.  Indeed, nothing more than the relatively conservative two-dimensionalism of Davies 
and Humberstone (1980) is required for what I say here. 
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The same thing happens in the case of ‘The actual realization of T is the realization 
of T’. The A-intension of this statement is true at all and only those worlds where T is 
uniquely realized, regardless of which properties realize it at that world. This is simply 
because for any world w where T is uniquely realized, the statement ‘The actual realization 
of T is the realization of T’ is true at w considered as actual. However, the C-intension of 
‘The actual realization of T is the realization of T’ is not true at every world where T is 
uniquely realized. In particular, it is false at any world where T does not have the same 
realization that it does in this (the actual) world. This allows us to explain the ambiguity in 
(1). If the embedded statement in (1) expresses its A-intension, then (1) is false, provided 
only that we will come to know that T is uniquely realized. However, only if the embedded 
statement in (1) expresses its C-intension is (1) equivalent to Lewis’ thesis. 
This concludes my reconstruction of Lewis’s thesis and his argument for it. I turn 
now to the criticisms and my defense. 
 
Section Three: Whittle’s Response to Humility 
Ann Whittle (2006) argues that even if Lewis’s metaphysical assumptions are correct, ‘we 
can [still] know which property occupies a certain role, because we are able to identify the 
property in question’ (p. 469). I disagree. 
Whittle’s argument explicitly assumes a version of Russell’s principle: being able to 
identify A is having ‘discriminating knowledge’ of A, where one has discriminating 
knowledge of A if one has a description that uniquely picks out A. Thus, since we can 
uniquely pick out the property that realizes such-and-such role with the description ‘the 
property that realizes such-and-such role’, it follows by Whittle’s version of Russell’s 
principle that we can identify the property that realizes such and such role. 
The first thing to notice about Whittle’s version of Russell’s principle is just how 
cheap it makes identification.  An example should make this clear.  Suppose we’re in a 
courtroom and I’m on the stand. An attorney asks me, ‘Do you know which person stole 
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your chicken?’ Suppose that all I know about the person who stole my chicken is that the 
person who stole my chicken is the person who stole my chicken. However, it turns out that 
there is a unique person who stole my chicken.  It follows by Whittle’s version of Russell’s 
principle that I can identify the person who stole my chicken, since I have a description that 
uniquely picks out the person who stole my chicken. 
Clearly Lewis had a stronger notion of ‘identification’ in mind when he stated his 
thesis.  Whittle agrees.  She writes, ‘Lewis, however, seems to think that something more is 
required: that we be able to single out the entity from all other actual and possible entities’ 
(470).  But she goes on to argue that 
 
[S]uch a condition on identification seems too strong. Suppose, for instance, that I 
am a historian who knows all there is to know about Napoleon and this knowledge, 
we can safely assume, allows me to single out one person in history, namely 
Napoleon. Granted a certain view about the transworld identities of particulars, 
namely Haecceitism, this exhaustive knowledge of Napoleon would, nevertheless, 
fail to identify him. Why? Haecceitism states that two possibilities can differ just in 
the permutation of individuals. So everything could be qualitatively identical in two 
possible worlds, yet those worlds differ in that the person we name ‘Napoleon’ 
instantiates all the same properties that Nelson does in this world, and vice versa.  
(ibid) 
 
Whittle’s mistake, it seems to me, is searching for one (or perhaps a few) notions that 
deserve the title ‘identification’.  As many theorists have noted, expressions such as 
‘identification’, ‘knowing what’, and ‘knowing which’ are all highly context-sensitive.46  In 
(1995), Lewis himself notes that in addition to all the common and less demanding senses 
of these expressions, there is ‘an uncommonly demanding and literal sense’ (142).  
                                                
46 See, for example, Aloni (2005), Gerbrandy (1997), and van Rooy (2003). 
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Moreover, Lewis explicitly notes (2008: 215 and endnote 20) that it is this ‘uncommonly 
demanding sense’ that he has in mind when he says that we will never know which 
properties realize T. 
How does this fit with my reconstruction of Lewis’s argument above?  I stated that 
according to the standard analysis of knowledge-which, S knows-which is the F iff S knows 
P, where P is the true answer to the question ‘Which is the F?’.  The different senses of 
‘knows-which’ (or of ‘identification’) can be modeled using this analysis by varying what 
counts as the true answer to ‘Which is the F?’.  If we want a more demanding sense, we 
simply require that only more specific propositions count as answers to ‘Which is the F?’.  
Taking this process to its limit, we get the ‘uncommonly demanding and literal sense’ of 
knowing-which.  In this sense of knowing-which, to know-which is to know the maximally 
specific answer to the question.  In our case, the question is ‘Which possible realization of 
T is the realization of T?’  Assuming that <P1,P2,…Pn> is that actual realization of T, the 
maximally specific answer to our question is simply the proposition that <P1,P2,…,Pn> 
realizes T.  And, by the knowledge-that stage of Lewis’s argument, this is a proposition 
that we will never know.47 
In any case, whether or not Lewis is correct to state his thesis in terms of ‘knowing 
which’ or ‘identification’—that is, whether the knowledge-which stage of Lewis’s 
argument is sound—the more interesting question would seem to be whether the argument 
through the knowledge-that stage is sound.  After all, the knowledge-that stage itself 
concludes with a claim about our irremediable ignorance.  Let us then move on to a 
discussion of Schaffer (2005) and Langton (2004), whose criticisms appear to be directed 
precisely at this earlier stage of the argument. 
 
                                                
47 I should note that Whittle does believe that some epistemic conclusion follows from Lewis’s argument—
namely, that we do not know the ‘intrinsic natures’ of the properties that realize T.  But that it is to pair 
quidditism with the uncomfortable thesis that properties have ‘intrinsic natures’.  See the Introduction and 
Chapter One for my explanation of why that can and ought to be avoided. 
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Section Four: This Ain’t Your Daddy’s Skepticism 
In ‘Quiddistic Knowledge’ (2005), Jonathan Schaffer argues that quiddistic skepticism ‘is 
just a species of skepticism about the external world’ and that, therefore, ‘whatever answer 
one offers to skepticism about the external world will thereby answer quiddistic 
skepticism’ (p. 19).  
I believe that Schaffer is wrong about quiddistic skepticism: it is not ‘just a species 
of skepticism about the external world’.  Moreover, I believe that the way in which 
quiddistic skepticism differs from traditional external-world skepticism is precisely what 
makes quiddistic skepticism immune to nearly all of the typical responses to traditional 
external-world skepticism.48 Let me first illustrate the difference between quiddistic 
skepticism and traditional skepticism by discussing two of Schaffer’s attempts to apply a 
standard response to traditional skepticism to quiddistic skepticism.  After I discuss these 
responses, I’ll attempt to state in somewhat more precise terms the difference between 
quiddistic skepticism and traditional skepticism and why most standard responses to the 
latter will be unsuccessful responses to the former. 
 
Deductionism (aka the Moorean ‘common sense’ response) 
Consider what Schaffer calls the ‘deductionist’ response to external-world skepticism, 
which takes the following form. 
 
(2) I know that p (by common sense). 
(3) If I know that p, then I am in a position to know that q. 
(4) Therefore, I am in a position to know that q. 
 
                                                
48 However, I do believe that Schaffer is right in that one of the responses to external-world skepticism (direct 
realism) does stand a chance at refuting quiddistic skepticism. I will discuss this potentially successful 
response in section 6.  
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where p entails q. If we add to the above argument the assumption that I have deduced q 
from p, it follows that I know that q. 
To take a particular example, the deductionist might respond to the brain-in-a-vat 
skeptic as follows: 
 
(5) I know that I have hands (by common sense). 
(6) If I know that I have hands, then I am in a position to know that I am not a 
handless brain in a vat. 
(7) Therefore, I am in a position to know that I am not a handless brain in a vat. 
 
Might we offer a deductionist response to quiddistic skepticism? Schaffer thinks so.  
 
[Just] as the deductionist claims that by starting with one’s knowledge that one has 
hands, one can come to know that the external world is real, so she should claim 
that by starting with one’s knowledge that, for instance, this brick has mass, one can 
come to know the quiddities. The same deductive moves are available in both cases 
(2005: 21).  
 
So Schaffer thinks that the deductionist should offer something like the following reply to 
quiddistic skepticism: 
 
(8) I know that this brick has mass (by commons sense). 
(9) If I know that this brick has mass, then I am in a position to know that mass 
realizes the mass role.49 
                                                
49 When I speak of ‘the mass role’, I mean the role of being the ith member of the realization of T, where 
‘mass’ is the ith T-term in the postulate of T.  If ‘mass’ is not a T-term of T, then Schaffer’s example will need 
to be adjusted accordingly. 
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(10) Therefore, I am in a position to know that mass realizes the mass role. 
 
Will this line of argument work?  If so, it must be ‘common sense’ that I know that 
this brick has mass.  Suppose, on the deductionist’s behalf, that it is common sense that I 
know that this brick has mass. What proposition do I thus know? 
I stated earlier that T implicitly defines the T-terms. According to Lewis (1970, 
1972, 2008), a T-term ti is equivalent to the definite description ‘the xi such that there exist 
unique x1,x2,…,xn such that T(x1,x2,…,xi,…,xn)’—for short, ‘the property that realizes the ti 
role’.  Such definitions are commonly known as ‘Ramsey-style definitions’. Here is one 
variation of the story that Lewis often told to motivate the idea that T-terms have Ramsey-
style definitions: 
 
We are assembled in the drawing room of the country house; the detective 
reconstructs the crime.  That is, he proposes a theory designed to be the best 
explanation of the phenomena we have observed: the death of Mr. Body, the blood 
on the wallpaper, the silence of the dog in the night, the clock seventeen minutes 
fast, and so on.  He launches into his story: 
X, Y and Z conspired to murder Mr. Body. Seventeen years ago, in the gold 
fields of Uganda, X was Body’s partner… Last week, Y and Z conferred in a bar in 
Reading… Tuesday night at 11:17, Y went to the attic and set a time bomb… 
Seventeen minutes later, X met Z in the billiard room and gave him the lead pipe… 
Just when the bomb went off in the attic, X fired three shots into the study through 
the French windows… 
And so it goes: a long story.  Let us pretend that it is a long conjunctive 
sentence. 
 The story contains three names, ‘X’, ‘Y’ and ‘Z’.  The detective uses the new 
terms without explanation, as though we knew what they meant.  But we do not.  
We never used them before, at least not in the senses they bear in the present 
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context.  All we know about their meanings is what we gradually gather from the 
story itself.  Call these… T-terms… because they are introduced by a theory.  Call 
the rest of the terms in the story O-terms… 
 In telling his story, the detective set forth three roles and said that they were 
occupied by X, Y and Z.  He must have specified the meanings of the three T-terms 
‘X’, ‘Y’ and ‘Z’ thereby; for they had meanings afterwards, they had none before, 
and nothing else was done to give them meanings.  They were introduced by an 
implicitly functional definition, being reserved to name the occupants of the three 
roles… 
 If, as I claim, the T-terms are definable as naming the first, second and third 
occupants of the unique triple that realizes the story, then the T-terms can be treated 
like definite descriptions… (1972: 249 – 252) 
 
And just in case you are thinking that the descriptions merely fix the referents of the T-
terms, without actually giving their semantic contents, Lewis goes on to say 
 
If the story is uniquely realized, they name what they ought to name; if the story is 
unrealized or multiply realized, they are like improper descriptions.  If too many 
triples realize the story, ‘X’ is like ‘the moon of Mars’; if too few triples—none—
realize the story, ‘X’ is like ‘the moon of Venus’.  Improper descriptions are not 
meaningless. Hillary Putnam has objected that on this sort of account of theoretical 
terms, the theoretical terms of a falsified theory come out meaningless [(Putnam 
1962)].  But they do not, if theoretical terms of unrealized theories are like improper 
descriptions.  ‘The moon of Mars’ and ‘The moon of Venus’ do not (in any way) 
name anything here in our actual world; but they are not meaningless, because we 




If Lewis’s semantics of T-terms is correct, and if ‘mass’ is a T-term, then ‘mass’ is 
equivalent to the definite description ‘the property that realizes the mass role’.50  Let us 
then reconstruct the deductionist’s argument in (8), (9), and (10) in light of this 
equivalence. 
 
(8*) I know that this brick has the property that realizes the mass role (by common 
sense). 
(9*) If I know that this brick has the property that realizes the mass role, then I am 
in a position to know that the property that realizes the mass role is the property 
that realizes the mass role. 
(10*) Therefore, I am in a position to know that the property that realizes the mass 
role is the property that realizes the mass role. 
 
According to (10*), what I am in a position to know is that some unique property realizes 
the mass role.  But quiddistic skepticism is the thesis that we will never know which 
property (in the demanding sense) realizes the mass role—that is, we will never know the 
proposition that is true at all and only those worlds where the property that actually realizes 
the mass role is the property that realizes the mass role. 
 What about rigidifying our descriptions?  Consider 
 
(8**) I know that this brick has the property that actually realizes the mass role (by 
commons sense). 
(9**) If I know that this brick has the property that actually realizes the mass role, 
then I am in a position to know that the property that actually realizes the mass 
role is the property that realizes the mass role. 
                                                
50 This isn’t circular, just shorthand.  Please see the previous note. 
 55 
(10**) Therefore, I am in a position to know that the property that actually realizes 
the mass role is the property that realizes the mass role. 
 
The conclusion of this argument (10**) indeed contradicts quiddistic skepticism, but only if 
we read the sentence containing the definite description ‘the property that actually realizes 
the mass role’ as expressing its C-intensions (see section 3 above).  Is this a move the 
deductionist can make?  I don’t think so: in that case the plausibility that the first premise is 
‘common sense’ has gone right out the window.  What is common sense (if anything here 
is) is that we know that this brick has mass, which, by Lewis’s semantics for T-terms, is 
knowing that this brick has the property that realizes the mass role, it is not knowing that 
this brick has P (where ‘P’ names the property that realizes the mass role). 
 
Abductionism (aka inference to the best explanation) 
The abductionist response to external-world skepticism claims that (1) the hypothesis that 
there is an external world is a better explanation of our experiences than the hypothesis 
that, say, we are dreaming and (2) if P is the best explanation of one’s experiences, then 
one can come to know that P by an inference to the best explanation. Schaffer claims that 
the abductionist ought to have a parallel response to quiddistic skepticism: ‘[Just] as the 
abductionist claims that skeptical scenarios constitute poor explanations of the appearances, 
so she should claim that quiddity swapping scenarios constitute more complex, less 
conservative, or at least somehow inferior explanations of the powers’ (2005: 22). In a 
footnote to this passage, Schaffer admits that the abductionist will have a difficult time 
making the case that the ‘quiddity swapping’ scenarios (i.e., the alternative realization 
scenarios) constitute inferior explanations of the powers. However, he seems to be 
suggesting that since these same difficulties arise for the abductionist response to 
traditional skepticism, there is no special difficulty for the abductionist response to 
quiddistic skepticism. 
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I disagree. Although there are difficulties for the abductionist’s claim that the 
normal external-world hypothesis is a better explanation of our experiences than the 
skeptical hypothesis, at least in that case one can distinguish various features of the 
competing hypotheses that then figure in the arguments for which is the better explanation. 
For example, the external-world hypothesis postulates the existence of many things outside 
of our minds, whereas the dreaming hypothesis does not. But are there any such 
distinguishing features of the competing hypotheses in the case of quiddistic skepticism?  
Let R1 and R2 be two possible realizations of T, such that the first and second 
members of R1 are permuted in R2. Now consider H1, the hypothesis that R1 realizes T and 
H2, the hypothesis that R2 realizes T. What are the distinguishing features of H1 and H2? 
Well, simply the fact that according to H1, R1 realizes T whereas according to H2, R2 
realizes T.  Is this difference between H1 and H2 relevant to which is the better explanation?  
There seems to be absolutely no way to tell, and the reason for this is a fact about our 
limited grasp on these two hypotheses. 
If R1 is the actual realization of T, it may seem that we can represent H1 with the 
sentence ‘<t1,t2,…,tn> realizes T(x1,x2,…,xn)’, where this sentence uses each T-term ‘ti’.  
But if we learned our lesson from above, then we’ll know that that won’t do the trick.  
According to Lewis, the sentence just mentioned is equivalent to the sentence ‘the n-tuple 
that realizes T is the n-tuple that realizes T’.  This sentence is trivial (save its existential 
and uniqueness presuppositions) and obviously does not express the hypothesis H1.  What 
we’ll have to do, if we want to use some sentence like the above to represent H1, is rigidify 
our descriptions.  Thus, the sentence ‘the n-tuple that actually realizes T is the n-tuple that 
realizes T’ manages to express the hypothesis H1.  Similarly, the sentence ‘the n-tuple 
formed by permuting the first and second members of the n-tuple that actually realizes T 
realizes T’ manages to express the hypothesis H2. 
Our question, remember, is whether H1 and H2 have any distinguishing features 
such that we can infer to H1 on the grounds that it is a better explanation than H2.  But now 
it should be fairly clear that we do not have a rich enough grasp on these two hypothesis to 
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be in a position to know what the relevant differences between them are.  As Lewis would 
say, our rigidified descriptions enable us to represent the hypotheses in question but only in 
such a way that we are ‘blinded’ to their distinguishing features.51 
Consider the detective in Lewis’s story above.  Suppose that Jack actually realizes 
the X role and that Bridget actually realizes the Y role.  Now suppose that the only means 
that the detective has of representing the hypothesis that Jack realizes the X role and 
Bridget realizes the Y role is with the sentence ‘The person who actually realizes the X role 
realizes the X role and the person who actually realizes the Y role realizes the Y role’.  Can 
the detective thus infer that proposition (over the proposition that Mary realizes the X role 
and John the Y role) by an inference to the best explanation?  On pain of allowing too 
much knowledge too easily, we had better say ‘no’.  Through his ineliminable use of 
rigidified descriptions, the detective is blinded to any features of that hypothesis that makes 




At this point we should be asking ourselves questions along the following lines.  Don’t we, 
or might we someday, have a language rich enough to express the true hypothesis about 
which properties realize T without the use of blind rigidification?  If so, couldn’t we then 
infer to that proposition via inference to the best explanation?  Moreover, if we have such a 
language, then perhaps it contains some sentence S, such that it will be common sense that 
we know S (here S is used) and such that S expresses the proposition that this brick has the 
property that actually realizes the mass role.  If so, couldn’t we then deduce the proposition 
that Lewis claims we don’t know? 
                                                
51 We can of course distinguish the hypotheses in trivial ways such as the proposition expressed by such and 
such sentence vs the proposition expressed by such and such other sentence.  But I take it that those 
distinctions are irrelevant to which is the better explanation. 
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 The crux of the matter is whether we have or ever will have a language that is 
expressive enough to rigidly refer to the properties that realize T without the use of 
rigidified descriptions or expressions that are equivalent to rigidified descriptions.  Lewis 
seems committed to saying ‘no’.  The theory T, recall, is supposed to be the ‘true and 
complete final theory of our world’.  It would thus seem that the language of T is as 
expressive of a language as we will ever have.  And by Lewis’ assumption that the 
language of T is not expressive enough to rigidly refer to the properties that realize T 
without the use of rigidified descriptions, it seems to follow that we will never have a 
language that it is that expressive. 
In my opinion, it is no accident that Lewis’s paper is titled ‘Ramseyan Humility’, 
rather than, say, ‘Quiddistic Skepticism’.  Lewis calls quiddistic skepticism ‘Ramseyan 
Humility’ because it’s due to a certain (alleged) fact about our language—namely, that our 
only terms for the fundamental properties that realize T have Ramsey-style definitions.  
This, I believe, is really what distinguishes quiddistic skepticism from traditional, external 
world skepticism.  In the case of traditional skepticism, we have a non-trivial grasp on the 
relevant alternative possibilities.  But in the case of quiddistic skepticism, our only means 
of distinguishing the relevant possibilities is with blindly-rigidified definite descriptions.  




Before moving on, I’d like to test the hypothesis I introduced in the previous paragraph.  
Let’s look at one more standard response to traditional skepticism—contextualism—and 
see if it too fails as a response to quiddistic skepticism for the reason I just mentioned. 
When I gave Lewis’s analysis of knowledge above, I left out his famous sotto voce 
proviso. Here is Lewis’s analysis in its entirety: 
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Lewisian Knowledge: S knows that P if and only if S’s evidence eliminates all 
possibilities in which not-P—Psst!—except for those possibilities that we are 
properly ignoring (Lewis 1999: 425). 
 
Lewis argues that, in certain contexts, we can truly be said to ‘know’ (as uttered in those 
contexts) that we have hands, because we are properly ignoring all the possibilities in 
which we don’t have hands that our evidence does not eliminate (e.g., the possibility of 
being a handless-brain-in-a-vat).  
Can we make this sort of response to quiddistic skepticism? Again, Schaffer thinks 
so: ‘[Just] as the contextualist allows that claims to know that one has hands count as true 
when skeptical scenarios are not salient, so she should allow that claims to know which 
properties exist count as true when quiddity-swapping scenarios are not salient’ (2005: 23). 
Rae Langton (2004) agrees: 
 
If Lewis shows us how we can ‘properly ignore’ the skeptical possibility, perhaps 
the same strategy could show us how we can ‘properly ignore’ [the alternative 
realization possibilities]. The good news for my reader, then, is that your knowledge 
of things in themselves may be safe—at least as far as the argument for Ramseyan 
Humility is concerned. (134–135) 
 
Unfortunately, we’re about to see that a contextualist response to quiddistic 
skepticism doesn’t have much plausibility. Lewis’s brand of contextualism, in particular, is 
committed to this being the case. Here is Lewis’s explanation of why we do not know that 
a given lottery ticket will lose, no matter how low the odds (a version of the so-called 
lottery paradox). 
 
Suppose one possibility saliently resembles another. Then if one of them may not 
be properly ignored, neither may the other. . . . It is the Rule of Resemblance that 
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explains why you do not know that you will lose the lottery, no matter what the 
odds are against you and no matter how sure you should therefore be that you will 
lose. For every ticket, there is the possibility that it will win. These possibilities are 
saliently similar to one another: so either every one of them may be properly 
ignored, or else none may. But one of them may not properly be ignored: the one 
that actually obtains [by Lewis’s Rule of Actuality]. (1999: 429–430) 
 
(Lewis also uses the Rule of Resemblance to explain why the subjects of Gettier cases do 
not know what they truly and justifiedly believe.) 
If Lewis is right that we may not properly ignore possibilities that saliently 
resemble actuality, then it is difficult to see how there could be a context in which we are 
properly ignoring alternative realization scenarios. As before, suppose R1 is the actual 
realization of T, and R2 is just like R1 except that the first two members of R1 have been 
permuted in R2. What could more saliently resemble actuality (the possibility that R1 
realizes T) than the possibility that R2 realizes T?  Salient resemblance is a matter of 
resemblance with respect to the features that we are paying attention to.  But, given that our 
only grasp on the properties that realize T is through the use of blindly-rigidified definite 
descriptions, the possibility in which R1 realizes T and the possibility in which R2 realizes 
T are identical with respect to every feature we ever could pay attention to—again, they 
have no features that we are in a position to distinguish.  Hence, their salient resemblance is 
guaranteed, and thus we cannot properly ignore one if we cannot properly ignore the other. 
 
This concludes my discussion of the responses to ordinary skepticism that won’t work as 
responses to quiddistic skepticism.  I now turn to 
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Section Five: Two Dogs That Might Hunt 
In the preceding sections we saw that three of the most popular responses to traditional 
skepticism are unsuccessful when it comes to quiddistic skepticism. But there are two 
responses that do have some initial plausibility as responses to quiddistic skepticism.  My 
intention here is not to defend these responses as successful responses to quiddistic 
skepticism. To do that, I would need to defend the principles upon which they, 
respectively, rest. My point here is simply to show that if one of these principles is right, 
then quiddistic skepticism is false (or, rather, we have no reason to think that it is true). 
 
Anti-quidditism 
The first response to consider is that of denying the metaphysical assumption upon which 
the argument for quiddistic skepticism rests, namely, quidditism. If the properties that 
actually realize T are the only theories that could have realized T, then knowing the 
proposition that T is realized just is knowing the true proposition about which properties 
realize T.52   
I hope that Chapter One has gone some way to convince you of the plausibility of 
quidditism.  But is the fact that quiddistic skepticism follows from quidditism itself a 
reason to reject quidditism?  Although some philosophers have seemed to think so, I for 
one cannot see why this should be.  Unless we have some independent reason to think that 
we will know which properties realize the final theory, it seems that we cannot reject 
quidditism merely on the grounds that it implies quiddistic skepticism.  As David Lewis 
puts it ‘Who ever promised me that I was capable in principle of knowing everything?’ 
(2008: 211) 
 
                                                
52 This of course assumes that propositions are no more finely individuated than sets of possible worlds.  If 
you think that propositions—or whatever the objects of knowledge are—are more finely individuated than 
that, then quiddistic skepticism could be true even if quidditism is false. 
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Direct Realism 
The other response to quiddistic skepticism that has at least some plausibility is a kind of 
direct realism about the properties that realize T. Lewis himself considers such a response: 
 
A friend of phenomenal qualia might speculate that all the actually instantiated 
fundamental properties are qualia. That would not preclude them from also 
occupying physical roles—a sort of panpsychism. So, even if our true final theory is 
a physical theory, they might be the members of its actual realization. He might also 
accept the Identification Thesis: anyone acquainted with a quale knows just which 
property it is [it the strong sense of knowing-which]. Now it may seem that we can 
know the identities of the fundamental properties after all—we need only become 
acquainted with them. (2008: 217) 
 
Interestingly, Lewis rejects this response to quiddistic skepticism not because it requires 
that the fundamental properties be qualia, but because he rejects the Identification Thesis. 
I do not want to debate the Identification Thesis here. My point is simply to note 
that (A) the response Lewis is considering seems to be something of a direct realist 
response and (B) the direct realist response at least stands some chance of refuting 
quiddistic skepticism. 
Why does the direct realist response stand a chance or refuting quiddistic 
skepticism, while other standard responses to traditional skepticism do not? The direct 
realist will deny Lewis’s assumption that the O-language refers to the fundamental 
properties only by means of descriptions of their roles. Consider the fundamental property 
referred to by the T-term ‘t1’. Now imagine the direct realist becoming directly acquainted 
with t1 (as a quale) and, according to the Identification Thesis, thereby knowing which 
property she is acquainted with. Now imagine her ‘baptizing’ this property with the O-term 
‘o1’. This is enough to block Lewis’s argument that T has multiple possible realizations.  
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Recall that that argument assumed that (1) the O-language refers to fundamental properties 
only by means of role-descriptions and (2) the O-language suffices to describe all possible 
observations. If the direct realist is right about this case, then it seems that ‘o1’ does not 
refer to o1 by means of a role-description. Thus, if the term ‘o1’ is made part of the O-
language, then (1) is not true. If, on the other hand, the term ‘o1’ is not made part of the O-
language (because, say, terms of direct acquaintance such as ‘o1’ can only be part of a 
private language), then (2) is not true, because there is a possible observation that the O-
language does not describe—namely, that of becoming directly acquainted with o1.53 
 
Section Six: Capitulation 
The final response to quiddistic skepticism that we should consider is capitulation. This is 
of course Lewis’s own response. He asks rhetorically, “[Why] should I want to block that 
argument? Why is [quiddistic skepticism] ‘ominous’?” (2008: 211). If there is one thing 
that all parties to the dispute over quiddistic skepticism are agreed to, it is that quiddistic 
skepticism is probably the most benign form of ignorance one could have. Not knowing 
which properties realize T is nothing, to say the least, like not knowing that one has hands, 
not knowing that one is having a conversations with other people, or not knowing that the 
sun will rise tomorrow. 
What has been less than clear, I think, is exactly why quiddistic skepticism is less 
ominous than, say, traditional, external-world skepticism. I think that things here have been 
confused because there are two ways in which quiddistic skepticism is less ominous than 
traditional skepticism. The first, and fairly well-recognized way, is that quiddistic 
skepticism claims that we will never know something that we never believed we did know 
                                                
53 As Lewis’s notes, this second possibility is rather dubious: there seems to be no reason why agents would 
have a private language that was more expressive than the language of T, which is, recall, the true and 
complete final theory of our world. 
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(consider again the deductionist response from above). The traditional skeptic, on the other 
hand, makes claims that we do not know things that we certainly do believe we know.  
However, there is a second, and perhaps more important way in which quiddistic 
skepticism is less ominous than traditional skepticism: while traditional skepticism posits 
ignorance of facts that are relevant to decisions we must make (should we give to charity or 
live for hedonistic pleasure?) quiddistic skepticism posits ignorance of facts that are in 
principle irrelevant to any decision that we could ever face.  Convincing you of this and 







THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF SKEPTICISM 
 
 
The ancient Greeks seem to have been very concerned with the practical significance of 
their philosophical views, and with the practical significance of skepticism in particular.  
Pyrrho and Carneades held that skepticism, if properly practiced, would lead to a life of 
contentment.  But not all philosophers agreed, and debate raged on.  Contemporary 
philosophers, by contrast, have dedicated the lion’s share of their work on skepticism to 
whether this, that, or the other type skepticism is true and why or why not.   
In this paper, I want to set-aside the question of whether this, that, or the other type 
of skepticism is true, and make a return to question: so what?  Now my question here will 
not quite be the same as that with which the ancients seemed to have been most concerned.  
They seem to have been primarily concerned with the question: how will/should one’s 
behavior change if one becomes a skeptic?  My question is no doubt related to these, but it 
is different.  My question is this: does the truth of some type of skepticism—regardless of 
whether one becomes a skeptic—have implications for how we ought to behave? 
I will be arguing that in some cases the answer is ‘yes’, and the primary goal of this 
paper is to say in which cases.  To this end, I will be making two crosscutting distinctions 
between types of skepticism, giving us four types of skepticism in all.  I will argue that 
skepticisms of exactly one of these types have practical significance.  Along the way, we 
will see that quiddistic skepticism—the skepticism argued for in the previous chapter—is a 
skepticism without practical significance.  We will also see that at least one type of 
traditional, external-world skepticism is a skepticism with practical significance. 
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Section One: Four Varieties of Skepticism 
The first distinction between skepticism that I would like to draw is a familiar one.  On the 
one hand, there are views according to which we cannot know some proposition P.  On the 
other hand, there are views according to which we are cannot justifiably believe some 
proposition P.  Philosophers typically refer to these, respectively, as ‘knowledge 
skepticisms’ and ‘justification skepticisms’.  With respect to propositions about the 
external world, an example of knowledge skepticism is the thesis that we cannot know that 
there are rocks, tables, etc. An example of justification skepticism is the thesis that we 
cannot justifiably believe that there are rocks, tables, etc..  Finally, if you accept the 
common assumption that justification is necessary but not sufficient for knowledge, then 
you will think that, with respect to a given proposition P, justification skepticism about p is 
a stronger claim than knowledge skepticism about P. 
 I trust that the distinction between knowledge skepticism and justification 
skepticism is familiar enough.  But let me say one thing about what sort of ‘justification’ 
we have in mind when we speak of ‘justification skepticism’.  Philosophers typically draw 
a distinction between epistemic justification and pragmatic justification.  When I speak of 
‘justification skepticism’ I mean views that deny that we can be epistemically justified in 
believing a certain proposition.   
Of course, there is no agreed-upon definition of ‘epistemic justification’ or 
‘pragmatic justification’.54  Nonetheless, we can characterize the distinction as between the 
kind of justification one has for a belief in virtue of one’s evidence (epistemic justification) 
and the kind of justification one has for a belief in virtue of the consequences of having that 
belief (pragmatic justification).  That is all I will say about this matter for now.  Below, I 
will have quite a bit more to say on the distinction between these two types of justification 
and on the relationship between them. 
                                                
54 An agreed-upon definition of the former is, after all, one of the holy grails of epistemology.   
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 The other distinction I would like to draw between skepticisms is much less 
familiar, and getting clear on this distinction will take the remainder of this section.  
Roughly, the distinction is between skepticism that do, and skepticisms that do not allow 
that we can grasp or understand the proposition with respect to which they deny 
knowledge/justified belief.  I think there’s no better way to elucidate this distinction then to 
look straightaway at representative examples on each side of it. 
Here is how Peter Unger (1975) sums-up the classical argument for knowledge 
skepticism about the external world: 
 
We begin by arbitrarily choosing something concerning an external world which 
might... be known... e.g., that there are rocks…. Now, first, if someone... knows that 
there are rocks, then that person can know the following quite exotic thing: there is 
no evil scientist deceiving him into falsely believing that there are rocks... But, no 
one can ever know that this exotic situation does not obtain… So, thirdly, as a 
consequence of these two premises, we have our skeptical conclusion: you never 
know that there are rocks.  (pp. 7 – 8) 
 
As Unger says, the general strategy here is to take some proposition p that we think we 
know and then present what Unger calls a ‘contrast case’—that is, a proposition that entails 
that p is false, but which we cannot know not to obtain.  In this case, the proposition that 
we think we know is the proposition that there are rocks, and the contrast case is the 
proposition that there is a mad-scientist who is deceiving us into thinking that there are 
rocks. 
 Note a particular aspect of this familiar type of argument:  nowhere in the argument 
does the skeptic claim that there are any limits on what we can conceive, grasp, or 
understand.  In particular, the skeptic does not claim that we cannot conceive of rocks as 
opposed to mad scientists, or that we do not grasp the difference between rocks and mad 
scientists.  Rather, the skeptic allows that we understand what it would be for there to be 
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rocks rather than a deceiving mad scientist.  To put things roughly, this type of skeptic 
presupposes that we know what rocks and deceiving mad scientists are—at least in the 
relevant sense of being able to conceptually distinguish between the two—but argues that 
we do not know which of these things exists: we know what rocks are without knowing 
that they are. 
 Now let’s compare the above argument with the skeptical argument in Thomas 
Nagel’s ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’ (1974): 
 
I want to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat.  Yet if I try to imagine this, I am 
restricted to the resources of my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to 
the task... If anyone is inclined to deny that we can believe in the existence of a fact 
like this whose exact nature we cannot conceive, he should reflect that in 
contemplating the bats we are in much the same position that intelligent bats or 
Martians would occupy if they tried to form a conception of what it would be like to 
be us... Certainly it is possible for a human being to believe that there are facts 
which humans never will possess the requisite concepts to represent or comprehend. 
(pp. 439 – 440) 
 
Nagel concludes that we cannot know what it is like to be bat.  That is to say, Nagel 
concludes that there is some true proposition p about what it is like to be a bat such that we 
cannot know that p.  Hence, just like Unger’s, Nagel’s conclusion is a type of knowledge 
skepticism.55 
 But notice the decidedly different argumentative strategies of Unger and Nagel.  
While Unger uses the so-called ‘contrast-case’ method, Nagel uses what we might call the 
                                                
55 Admittedly, Nagel’s ultimate purpose in (1974) is not to argue for a kind of skepticism, but to raise a 
particular problem for physicalism about mental states.  Nonetheless, his immediate purpose here is to 
establish a kind of skepticism—namely, skepticism about the mental states of certain other creatures—and 
that skepticism plays a key role in his argument against physicalism. 
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‘inconceivability method’.  For Unger, the skeptical conclusion that we cannot know that p 
is meant to follow from the fact that there are two conceivable, mutually inconsistent 
propositions p and q such that we do know that not-q.  For Nagel, however, the skeptical 
conclusion that we cannot know that p is meant to follow from the fact that we cannot even 
conceive of p—that is, we do not have a grasp or understanding of what it would be for p 
to be true. 
I want to label these two types of skepticism—the types exemplified, respectively, 
by Unger and Nagel—‘Cartesian skepticism’ and ‘Kantian skepticism’.  (Why do I call the 
latter kinds of skepticism ‘Kantian’?  I come to this below.)  As I shall be using the terms, a 
Cartesian skeptic is someone who allows that we have a non-trivial grasp on at least two 
possible scenarios or propositions, but nonetheless holds that we cannot know that one of 
the scenarios obtains rather than the other.  A Kantian skeptic, on the other hand, is 
someone who thinks that we cannot know that one scenario obtains rather than another 
precisely because we have no non-trivial grasp of what it is for the one scenario to obtain 
rather than the other. 
Notice that the distinction between Cartesian and Kantian skepticism has nothing to 
do with a difference in domain.  The fact that Unger’s argument is a form of Cartesian 
skepticism has nothing to do with the fact that is about external objects (such as rocks) and 
the fact that Nagel’s skepticism is a form of Kantian skepticism has nothing to do with the 
fact that it is about bat sensations.  In fact, we could have Kantian skepticism about 
external objects and we could have Cartesian skepticism about bat sensations.  A Kantian 
skeptic about external objects might say something like this: 
 
There is something that is, in fact, causing our sense perceptions as of rocks.  But 
we have no conception of what this thing is, nor of what alternative things might 
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have been causing our perceptions as of rocks.  Hence, we cannot know what sort of 
thing is causing our sense perceptions as of rocks.56 
 
And a Cartesian skepticism about what it’s like to be a bat might look something like this: 
 
You think you know what it is like to be a bat—say, you think you know that it is 
pleasurable to be a bat. But if you know that, then you can know that it is not 
painful to be a bat.  But you cannot know that it is not painful to be a bat, and hence 
you do not know that it is pleasurable to be a bat.57 
 
 Cartesian skepticism, as I am using the term here, is probably what most 
philosophers have in mind when they use the term ‘skepticism’.  But Kantian skepticism 
has just as much right to that title, and instances of Kantian skepticism can be found 
throughout the philosophical literature.  In his classic (1905) and elsewhere, Bertrand 
Russell famously held that much of our knowledge is limited to what he calls ‘knowledge 
by description’—i.e., knowledge of general propositions, such as the proposition that there 
exist a unique so and so, as opposed to singular propositions, such as the proposition that a 
is a so and so, where ‘a’ names an individual.  In particular, Russell argued that we cannot 
know any singular proposition that is singular with respect to an individual mind other than 
one’s own.  In thus arguing for a certain limit on our knowledge, Russell is arguing for a 
kind of skepticism.  Moreover, if we consider just how his argument for this skeptical 
conclusion goes, we can see that his skepticism is Kantian, not Cartesian.  He writes: 
 
                                                
56 Putnam (1981) can reasonably be interpreted as arguing that traditional Cartesian skepticism about the 
external world ought to be replaced with this kind of Kantian skepticism about the external world. 
57 This sort of skepticism is just an instance of what usually goes by the name ‘skepticism about other minds’. 
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[When] there is anything which we do not have immediate acquaintance, but only 
definition by denoting phrases [e.g., ‘the F’], then the propositions in which this 
thing is introduced by means of a denoting phrase do not really contain this thing as 
a constituent, but contain instead the constituents expressed by the several words of 
the denoting phrase [e.g., the universal Fness].  Thus in every proposition that we 
can apprehend… all the constituents are really entities with which we have 
immediate acquaintance.  Now such things as matter (in the sense in which matter 
occurs in physics) and the minds of other people are known to us only by denoting 
phrases, i.e., we are not acquainted with them, but we know them as what has such 
and such properties.  Hence, although we can form propositional functions C(x) 
which must hold of such and such a material particle or of So-and-so’s mind, yet we 
are not acquainted with the propositions which affirm these things that we know 
must be true, because we cannot apprehend the actual entities concerned.  What we 
know is “So-and-so has a mind which has such and such properties” but we do not 
know “A has such and such properties,” where A is the mind in question.  In such a 
case, we know the properties of a thing without having acquaintance with the thing 
itself, and without, consequently, knowing any single proposition of which the thing 
itself is a constituent.  (2005: 492 – 493) 
 
For Russell, we cannot know that P, if P is a proposition that is singular with respect to 
other minds.  But the reason we cannot know that P, according to Russell, is precisely that 
we cannot even grasp or understand P.  Hence, Russell is offering a kind of Kantian 
skepticism. 
In Chapter Two I developed and defended an argument offered by David Lewis 
(2008) in favor of a kind of skepticism we called ‘quiddistic skepticism’?  Is that 
skepticism Cartesian or Kantian?  I think it is quite clearly Kantian.  As I understand it, 
Lewis’s argument for quiddistic skepticism goes something like this.  We start by assuming 
quidditism, which says that a fundamental property’s nomological role is only contingently 
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realized by that property.  From this it follows that merely knowing that such and such role 
is realized is not knowing which property realizes that role.  But can we gain additional 
evidence as to which property realizes the role?  I argued that we cannot gain such 
evidence and the reason that we cannot gain such evidence is that we cannot even grasp the 
true proposition about which property realizes the role. 
To make this clear, consider my discussion of abductionism.  Let H1 be the true 
proposition about which properties realize the nomological roles at our world and let H2 be 
some false proposition about which properties realize the roles.  I claimed that we cannot 
know that H1 is the true hypothesis precisely because we have no way of non-trivially 
representing H1.  We can, of course, represent H1 as the proposition that the properties that 
actually realize the roles are the properties that realize the roles.  But that does not give us 
a rich enough grasp on H1 to be able to infer H1, rather than H2, as the best explanation of 
our evidence.  (Notice that we can represent the true proposition about what its like to be a 
bat in the same sort of way.) 
Because the inability to grasp the relevant proposition plays a key role in the 
argument for quiddistic skepticism, the skepticism of Chapter Two is thoroughly Kantian.  .  
Indeed, the whole point of my argument in Chapter Two was to show that standard 
responses to traditional (i.e., Cartesian) skepticism about the external world do not apply to 
quiddistic skepticism precisely because the latter, at least as Lewis argues for it, is a kind of 
Kantian skepticism.  That is not to say that one couldn’t be a Cartesian quiddistic skeptic.  
To do so, one need only grant that we can grasp the true proposition about which properties 
realize the roles and then find some other reason for denying that we can come to know this 
proposition. But that is quite obviously not the kind of skepticism argued for in Chapter 
Two, and it is not what I have in mind when I speak of ‘quiddistic skepticism’. 
Finally, we come to the eponymous example of Kantian skepticism.  In Lewis’s 
(2008) paper, he says that his argument for quiddistic skepticism was inspired by an 
argument that Rae Langton (2001) attributes to Kant.  That argument, as I understand it, 
goes something like this: although for a given object O, there is a true proposition p 
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concerning which intrinsic properties O has, we do not know those properties, and hence 
we do not know what it would be for p to be true.  And from this it is supposed to follow 
that we cannot know that p.  Now I am not qualified to have an opinion on these matters, 
but it does seem to me that Descartes’ First Meditation is an exercise in what I’m calling 
Cartesian skepticism and Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason defends a kind of Kantian 
skepticism (whether it is precisely the skepticism that Langton attributes to Kant is another 
matter).  In any case, I politely request that you allow me to use these labels as I choose, 
and to not read too much into them. 
Thus far I have made the distinction between Kantian skepticism and Cartesian 
skepticism exclusively in terms of knowledge skepticism.  But it should be plain to see that 
the same distinction can be made between types of justification skepticism.  The distinction 
between Cartesian and Kantian skepticism is a distinction in the reasons that the skeptic 
has for holding his skeptical conclusion.  In the case of knowledge skepticism, the Kantian 
skeptic holds that one cannot know that p precisely because one cannot grasp that p.  In 
other words, he accepts an argument of something like this form: 
 
1.  We cannot grasp the proposition p. 
2.  Therefore, we cannot know that p. 
 
Equally, a justification-Kantian skeptic is one who accepts an argument of this form: 
 
1.  We cannot grasp the proposition p. 
2.  Therefore, we cannot justifiably believe that p. 
 
The Cartesian skeptic, on the other hand, grants that we can grasp p, yet nonetheless holds, 
for some other reason, that we cannot know/justifiably believe that p.  Perhaps, like Unger, 
he thinks that we cannot know/justifiably believe that p because we cannot know/justifiably 
believe that not-q, where q is a proposition that is inconsistent with p.  Or perhaps he makes 
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his knowledge/justified-belief denial for some other reason.  In any case, he does not make 
it for the reason that one cannot grasp p. 
The Kantian/Cartesian distinction thus crosscuts the knowledge/justification 
distinction.  Given this four-way distinction between types of skepticism, let’s get down to 
the business of this chapter: which of these types of skepticism have implications for how 
we ought to behave?  In the remainder of this chapter I’ll be arguing for the following 
answer: 
 







Section Two:  The Reasonable-belief Principle 
Suppose you face a decision—say, whether to go to the store or to stay home.  You may 
ask yourself: what ought I to do?  Or rather: which action is the thing to do?  You may 
answer the question by coming up with particular reasons, say, to go the store.  But can we 
fit these particular reasons into some more general pattern?  That is, is there a general 
answer to the question: given some action A, what conditions must be met for A to be the 
thing to do? 
Standard decision theory has an answer to this question: an action A is rational for a 
person S if and only if A has highest expected utility given S’s beliefs and values.  
Different versions of decision theory disagree on how exactly to define ‘expected utility’, 
but in this paper I’ll be assuming that some version of causal decision theory (CDT) gives 
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the correct definition.  Just to fix ideas, according to Gibbard and Harper’s version of CDT, 
expect utility is to be defined as follows: 
 
U(A) = ∑O P(A□→O)V(O) 
 
where A□→O is the subjunctive conditional if the agent were to do A, then this 
would cause it to be the case that O, P(A□→O) is the agent’s degree of belief that 
A□→O, and V(O) is the degree to which the agent values the outcome O.58 
 
But is this a complete story about which action is the thing to do?  In particular, is the fact 
that an action A has maximum expected utility given an agent’s actual beliefs and values 
sufficient for A’s being the thing to do, no matter what the agent’s beliefs and values are 
like?  Or must the agent’s beliefs and values satisfy some further condition?  Let’s consider 
a case. 
 
Howard is an ordinary guy, with ordinary evidence about the reliability of fortune 
cookies—that is, he has overwhelming evidence that they are completely unreliable.  
Nevertheless, Howard receives a fortune cookie that tells him that ‘good health will 
be his for a long time’ and, due to wishful thinking, he comes to hold the 
unreasonable belief that he will not become ill over the next year.  Accordingly, he 
decides to cancel his appointment to buy health insurance later that day.  Question: 
Was cancel his appointment the thing for Howard to do in his situation? 
  
                                                
58 Note that when used alone, ‘A’ stands for an action, but when use in ‘A□→O’, ‘A’ stands for the 
proposition that the agent in question performs A.  This is a simplification that I hope won’t cause any 
confusion. 
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There are two popular reactions to cases of this sort.  The first type of reaction says 
something like, ‘yes, cancel his appointment was the thing for Howard to do, because, after 
all, he believed that he would have good health, and that belief, together with his values 
(we are assuming his values are the ordinary ones), determine that that action has highest 
expected utility’.  The second type of response says, ‘no, cancel his appointment was not 
the thing for Howard to do in this situation because Howard did not have a reasonable 
belief that he would have good health for a long time; rather, Howard ought to have 
believed that there was a significance chance that he would not have good health for a long 
time, and, given that belief, cancel his appointment would not have had highest expected 
utility’.  These reactions can be seen as embodying, respectively, two competing principles. 
 
The Mere-Belief Principle: 59  A is the thing for S to do if and only if A has 
highest expected utility given S’s actual beliefs and values. 
 
The Reasonable-Belief Principle:  A is the thing for S to do if and only if A has 
highest expected utility given S’s values and the beliefs that it is reasonable for S to 
have.60 
 
According to the first principle, it simply doesn’t matter whether one’s beliefs are 
reasonable: if you have those beliefs, and those beliefs are such that action A has highest 
expected utility (given your values, or the values that it is reasonable to have),61 then A is 
the thing to do.  According to the second principle, however, the thing to do is determined, 
                                                
59 Generally, I call principles such as these ‘doxo-pragmatic principles’, as they server to connect questions 
about belief to questions about action. 
60 There is also, of course, room to argue over whether the action must have highest expected utility given S’s 
actual values or the values that she would be reasonable for S to have.  But this question is tangential to our 
discussion here, and so I set it aside. 
61 See previous note. 
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not by maximizing expected utility relative to one’s actual beliefs, but rather relative to the 
beliefs that one is reasonable to have. 
What does all this have to do with the practical significance of skepticisms?  
Suppose for the moment that the reasonable-belief principle is correct.  If, as some 
philosophers have argued, one’s beliefs are reasonable only if they are justified, it seems to 
follow that justification skepticisms will potentially have significance for what one ought to 
do.  Similarly, if knowledge (of something) is necessary for reasonable belief, then 
knowledge skepticisms potentially have practical significance as well.  We’ll return to the 
antecedents of these conditionals, and to the meaning of the ‘potentially’ qualifier below.  
For now, let’s just tentatively say this: if the reasonable-belief principle is correct, then 
both justification and knowledge skepticisms threaten to have practical significance. 
But is the reasonable-belief principle correct?  Here is something I think everyone 
can agree on: given the situation Howard was in just before he came to believe that he will 
be healthy for a long time—that is, just after he read the fortune cookie—the thing for 
Howard to do was, first, not come to believe that he will be healthy for a long time and, 
second, not cancel his appointment to buy health insurance.  One might think that this 
makes the case for the reasonable-belief principle.  But not so fast: defenders of the mere-
belief principle will say, sure, before Howard came to believe that he would have good 
health, the thing for him to do was to not cancel his appointment to buy health insurance; 
however, after he came to believe that he would have good health, cancel his appointment 
became the thing to do, even though his belief was unreasonable. 
 Moreover, defenders of the mere-belief principle might argue as follows.  Let us 
ask: what was Howard’s mistake?  Every reasonable epistemologist will agree that he made 
a mistake in holding the belief that he will have good health.  But did he make any mistake 
over and above that mistake?  We may be tempted to say that it was a mistake for him to 
cancel his appointment to buy health insurance.  But when we say that he made a mistake 
in acting the way he did, are we saying anything more than that he made a mistake in 
holding the belief upon which he based his action?  Suppose, for example, that instead of 
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canceling his appointment to buy health insurance, Howard went ahead and bought health 
insurance, all the while retaining his (unreasonable) belief that he would have good health.  
Wouldn’t he then be making a further mistake, a mistake over and above the mistake of 
holding the unreasonable belief?  In that case, not only would his belief have been 
unreasonable, but his action would have been, so to speak, one that didn’t even make sense 
by his own lights.  To perform such an action is surely to make some sort of mistake.  
Thus, proponents of the mere-belief principle will conclude, the thing for Howard to do, 
after forming the belief that he will have good health, was to cancel his appointment. 
 This line of argument is powerful indeed.  But I do not think it establishes what it 
purports to establish.  We need to be careful to separate two questions: first, ‘Has Howard 
made any mistake over and above holding the belief upon which he based his action?’, and, 
second, ‘Was Howard’s action the thing to do?’.  I think it is consistent to say that although 
Howard’s only mistake was to hold that belief, his action was not the thing to do.  In other 
words, Howard performed an action that was not the thing to do, but he did not thereby 
make a mistake (over and above holding the belief upon which the action was based). 
What makes an action the thing to do?  An action is the thing to do if and only if 
that action is the action one has most reason to do.  It seems clear to me that, in the 
situation envisioned above, the thing that Howard had most reason to do was to buy health 
insurance.  Howard’s evidence—being the evidence of an ordinary person in his 
situation—made it unreasonable for Howard to believe that he would have good health, and 
this gave Howard reason to buy health insurance.  Thus, not having any overriding reason 
to not buy health insurance, the thing that Howard had most reason to do was to buy health 
insurance.  Of course, Howard will say that canceling his appointment was the thing to do, 
and by his lights, that was the thing to do.  And although we should not agree with Howard 
on this, we should acknowledge that, other than simply being wrong about which action 
was the thing to do, and other than holding an unreasonable belief that he will have good 
health, Howard makes no mistakes. 
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What about the claim that Howard would be making a further mistake if he bought 
health insurance while maintaining his belief that he will have good health?  Doesn’t that 
show that the thing to do was to cancel his appointment?  No, it only shows that the thing 
to do was not to cancel his appointment while maintaining his belief that he will have good 
health.  But no one is claiming that.  Proponents of the reasonable-belief principle do not 
say that the thing for Howard to do was to buy health insurance while keeping his belief 
that he will have good health; they merely say that the thing for Howard to do was to buy 
health insurance.  If this requires, as I think it does, that Howard abandon his belief that he 
will have good health in order to avoid making a further mistake, then proponents of the 
reasonable-belief principle will conclude that the thing for Howard to do was to cancel his 
appointment and abandon his belief that he will have good health.  Given Howard’s 
evidential situation, that does seem like the thing for Howard to do. 
I tentatively conclude in favor of the reasonable-belief principle.  I admit that I 
haven’t said anything here that is going to unconvinced the convinced proponent of the 
mere-belief principle.  Still, my only hope is that I have made a strong enough case in favor 
of the reasonable-belief principle to take it on as a (tentative) assumption in what follows. 
Taking on the reasonable-belief principle gets us part way to the practical 
significance of skepticisms.  But it doesn’t get us all the way.  For that, we need to know 
whether knowledge, on the one hand, or justification, on the other, is necessary for 
reasonable belief. 
 
Section Three: Is Knowledge Necessary for Reasonable Belief? 
Few philosophers would claim that in order to be reasonable in believing that p, one must 
know that p.  After all, ‘knows’ is factive, whereas ‘reasonably believes’ is not.62 
                                                
62 I here set-aside the sense of ‘knows’ according to which it is often felicitous to say things like: ‘I can’t 
believe that he finished in last place—I just knew he would win!’. 
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Nevertheless, some philosophers have argued that knowledge of something is necessary for 
reasonable belief that p.  Peter Unger (1975) is just such a philosopher. 
Unger (1975) draws a distinction between knowledge skepticism, justification 
skepticism, and what we might call ‘reasonableness skepticism’—the claim that one cannot 
be reasonable in believing that p, for some specified proposition p.63  Unger points out that 
many philosophers have held that knowledge of a certain domain is impossible while 
maintaining that reasonable belief about that domain is not.  For example, many 
philosophers hold that although we cannot know that we are not brains in vats, we can 
nonetheless reasonably believe that we are not brains in vats.  Unger calls this the ‘retreat 
to reasonable belief’, and he is intent on showing that such a position is untenable.64 
More precisely, Unger wants to show that universal knowledge skepticism—
knowledge skepticism with respect to all propositions—implies universal reasonableness 
skepticism—reasonableness skepticism with respect to all propositions.65  He calls this the 
thesis that ‘ignorance implies irrationality’ and his argument runs as follows: 
 
                                                
63 Note that reasonableness skepticism and justification skepticism are not the same.  I discuss the relationship 
between them below. 
64 Unger is also intent on showing that knowledge skepticism implies justification skepticism.  Does that 
argument concern us here?  It does, but indirectly.  Below I argue that justification skepticism (at least some 
kinds of justification skepticisms) have practical significance.  Thus, if it’s true that knowledge skepticism 
implies justification skepticism, then at least some kinds of knowledge skepticism will have practical 
significance.  However, Unger’s argument for the claim that knowledge skepticism implies justification 
skepticism is precisely parallel to the argument we will consider in this section and fails for a precisely 
parallel reason.  See footnote 66 for more details. 
65 Unger also has arguments to the effect that more limited types of knowledge skepticism imply more limited 
types of justification skepticism.  However, those arguments depend on the argument for the thesis 
concerning universal skepticisms.  Thus, undermining the latter argument, which I plan to do here, will serve 
to undermine the former arguments. 
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(1)  If S is (even in the least bit) reasonable in believing that p, then there is 
something which is S’s reason for believing that p or there are some things which 
are S’s reasons for believing that p. 
 
(2)  If there is something which is S’s reason for believing that p, then there is some 
propositional value of ‘q’ such that S’s reason is that q and if there are some things 
which are S’s reasons for believing that p, then there are some propositional values 
of ‘q’ and ‘r’ and so on such that S’s reasons are that q and that r and so on. 
 
(3)  If S’s reason for believing that p is that q, then S knows that q; and if S’s 
reasons for believing that p are that q and that r and so on, then S knows that q and 
that r and so on.66 
 
Is Unger’s argument sound?  The inference from (1), (2), and (3) to the thesis that 
ignorance implies irrationality is, it seems to me, valid.  So to block the argument we must 
undermine one of its premises.   
The weakness, or at least one of the weaknesses, lies with (3).  Gettier cases will 
show us the light.  Suppose Jack is, unbeknownst to him, driving through fake-rain country, 
a place where the residents are intent on making it look like it has been raining each 
afternoon, even when it has not been.67  For example, every afternoon that it doesn’t rain, 
                                                
66 I have modified Unger’s argument by restricting it to the case of belief.  The premises and conclusion of 
Unger’s actual argument read ‘If S is (even in the least bit) reasonable in something X, then…’ etc.  Unger’s 
premises and conclusion thus actually cover not only when S is reasonable in believing something, but also 
when S is reasonable in doing some action.  Obviously, if the restricted version of Unger’s argument is 
unsound, as I argue below, then so is his general version. 
67 An example involving the well-known fake-barn country would equally server our purposes.  I use fake-
rain country merely for the sake of drawing a clear disanalogy with the case considered by Unger in favor of 
his third premise. 
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the residents of fake-rain country send out spray-and-sprinkle trucks to wet the grass.  But 
now suppose that on the day Jack is driving through fake-rain country, it has in fact rained, 
and Jack, although he arrives too late to see the rain, nonetheless sees the effects of the rain 
(the wet grass, etc.).  Now Jack receives a call from a friend on his mobile phone.  ‘How do 
the crops look around there?  Do you think they’ll grow?’ his friend asks.  ‘Yes,’ says Jack, 
‘The crops will grow.  It has been raining just this afternoon.’ 
What was Jack’s reason for believing that the crops will grow?  The answer, it 
seems, is that it was raining.  Nevertheless, since Jack is in fake-rain country, Jack does not 
know that it has was raining.  This shows, contra (3), that that q (that it was raining) can be 
one of Jack’s reasons for believing that p (that the crops will grow), even when Jack does 
not know that q.  If this is right, then Unger’s is wrong. 
 Interestingly, Unger considers a similar Gettier case and comes to the exact 
opposite conclusion.  Indeed, he takes the Gettier case he considers to provide a key piece 
of evidence in favor of (3).  He writes: 
 
[Suppose that] Mary was indoors but then she came outside and looked around.  
The ground and objects outside were all wet just as if wetted recently by falling 
rain.  And, other indications all pointed to its having rained.  Indeed, this is why 
Mary is certain that it was raining.  But, unbeknownst to Mary, while it did in fact 
rain, the rain was rapidly evaporated due to some extraordinary events: For one, the 
temperature outside went up to 130◦F. for an hour.  Right after the evaporation, 
some huge spray-and-sprinkle trucks swept by and covered the area with water 
again, and they did it in just the way that rain does.  So, it all looked just as if 
nothing had evaporated.  Because she sees the water, Mary is certain that it was 
raining.  And, because she is certain of this, Mary thinks that the crops will grow 
now.  Now, it is of course true that it was raining.  But is it true that Mary’s reason 
for thinking this about the crops is that it was raining?  She says that it is.  But it 
seems to me quite clear that that can’t be her reason… And, the reason for this 
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seems also quite clear: It must be false [to say that that is her reason] because Mary 
doesn’t know it was raining. 
 
Now we seem to be in a pickle.  We considered a Gettier case (Jack in fake-rain country) in 
which, intuitively, the unknown proposition could be the agent’s reason.  But Unger has a 
case (Mary in freakishly-high-temperatures country) in which, intuitively, the unknown 
proposition could not be the agent’s reason.  Do we have then an irreconcilable clash of 
intuitions?  Is there nothing left to do but hand the cases over to the ‘experimental 
philosophers’?  Fortunately, we need not break out the survey forms just yet.  The question 
is how can we reconcile the fact that Mary’s reason could not be that it was raining while 
Jack’s reason could.  To do so, we’ll need to find a crucial difference between the two 
cases.  I think we can find such a difference, and we can find it without having to leave our 
armchairs. 
 The obvious difference between the case of Jack and the case of Mary concerns 
whether the true belief that it was raining was (in part) caused by the fact that it was 
raining.  Jack’s belief that it was raining was caused by the fact that it was raining, while 
Mary’s believe that it was raining was not caused by the fact that it was raining—rather, it 
was caused by the fact that the spray-and-sprinkle trucks wetted the ground.  This, or 
something quite near it, explains why that it was raining could be one of Jack’s reasons for 
believing that the crops will grow, while that it was raining could not be one of Mary’s 
reasons for believing that the crops will grow. 
This suggests that we can handle Unger’s Gettier case with a principle that is 
distinct from Unger’s (3)—namely: 
 
(3*)  If S’s reason for believing that p is that q, then S’s belief that p was (in part) 
caused by the fact that q; and so on. 
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Rejecting (3) in favor of (3*) is enough to undermine Unger’s argument.  But I suspect that 
even (3*) doesn’t get things quite right.  Perhaps a more accurate principle is something 
like: 
 
(3**)  If S’s reason for believing that p is that q, then S’s belief that p 
counterfactually depends in a certain way on the fact that q; and so on. 
 
Maybe this still isn’t quite right.  In any case, it certainly isn’t very precise.  But for our 
purposes we need not worry about getting the principle exactly right..  My goal here is 
purely negative; it is to refute Unger’s argument that ignorance implies irrationality.  And I 
think the case of Jack and fake-rain country, by showing that Unger’s premise (3) is false, 
does just that.68,69 
                                                
68 Above I said that Unger gives a parallel argument for the thesis that knowledge skepticism implies 
justification skepticism.  That argument contains an analogy of premise (3) in the current argument: 
 
(3^)  If S’s justification for believing that p is that q, then S knows that q; and so on. 
 
This premise (3^) is wrong for a reason analogous to the reason that (3) is wrong: Jack does not know that it 
has rained, but his justification for believing that the crops will grow is, contra (3^), that is has rained. 
69 John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley (2008) defend a principle that is similar—but not equivalent—to 
Unger’s premise (3).  Does the argument presented here apply to Hawthorne and Stanley’s principle?  Indeed 
it does.  Here is their principle: 
 
The Action-Knowledge Principle.  It is appropriate to treat the proposition p as a reason for acting 
only if one knows that p. 
 
Consider again Jack in fake-rain country.  Jack does not know that it has rained.  But just as it is possible, 
contra Unger’s premise (3), for that it rained to be Jack’s reason for believing that the crops will grow, it is 
also appropriate, contra the Hawthorne and Stanley’s Action-Knowledge Principle, for Jack to treat the 
proposition that it has rained as a reason for telling his friend that the crops will grow. 
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Refuting one argument in favor of the thesis that knowledge (of something) is 
necessary for reasonable belief certainly does not refute the thesis itself.70  Is there 
something we can say against the thesis itself? 
 Consider a small child, Bridget, upon whom we unethically perform some 
experiments.  Suppose that we have placed a hallucinogenic drug into Bridget’s sippy cup, 
and Bridget is now hallucinating a red apple.  For this reason, she believes that there is a 
red apple on the table in front of her.  Skeptical worries aside, here it would seem that 
Bridget is perfectly reasonable in believing that there is a red apple in front of her.  
Nevertheless, Bridget certainly does not know that there is a red apple in front of her, nor 
does she know anything else that is relevant to her being reasonable in believing that there 
is a red apple in front of her.  For example, she doesn’t know that she is ‘having sensations 
as if there is a red apple in front of her’.  That is something she, lacking the concept of a 
sensation as of a red apple cannot even think, let alone know.  Thus, it seems that there is 
nothing that Bridget must know in order to reasonably believe that there is a red apple on 
the table in front of her.  There is no doubt that this isn’t a knock-down argument against 
the thesis that knowledge (of something) is necessary for reasonable belief.  But, in lieu of 
a convincing argument in favor of that thesis, I do think it gives us pretty good reason to 
reject it. 
Given the reasonable-belief principle, the upshot of rejecting the thesis that 
knowledge is required for reasonable belief is that knowledge skepticisms—theses to the 
                                                
70 What about Timothy Williamson’s (2002) thesis that E = K?  This is the thesis that one’s evidence is just 
what one knows.  Assume that E = K is correct.  Does Unger’s thesis that universal knowledge skepticism 
implies universal unreasonableness follow?  Not quite: for that, we need to add the assumption that one is 
reasonable in believing that p only if one has evidence for p.  But those two claims—the claim that E = K and 
the claim that one is reasonable in believing that p only if one has evidence for p—do not go happily together.  
This is shown by the case considered in the next paragraph.  There it is clear that Bridget is reasonable in 
believing that there is a red apple in front of her.  But if she does have evidence for this belief, that evidence 
is not something she knows to obtain. 
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effect that we do not know that p, for some specified proposition p—have no practical 
significance.  More precisely: knowledge skepticisms have no implications for how we 
ought to behave.  That takes care of the first two lines on our table. 
 









Section Five:  Is Justification Necessary for Reasonable Belief? 
In section one I drew the distinction between epistemic justification for belief and 
pragmatic justification for belief.  I also stipulated that when I speak of ‘justification 
skepticisms’, I mean epistemic justification.  So the question we need to ask in this section 
is whether epistemic justification is necessary for reasonable belief.  If so, justification 
skepticisms have the potential for serious practical implications. 
In the last section I distinguished between the claim that knowledge of p is 
necessary for reasonable belief that p and the claim that knowledge of something is 
necessary for reasonable belief that p.  Call those claims, respectively, the ‘strong claim 
that knowledge is necessary for reasonable belief’ and ‘the weak claim that knowledge is 
necessary for reasonable belief’.  We can make a similar distinction between claims about 
epistemic justification: on the one hand, we have the claim that epistemic justification for a 
belief that p is necessary for reasonable belief that p, and on the other hand we have the 
claim that epistemic justification for a belief about something is necessary for reasonable 
 87 
belief that p.  Call these, respectively, ‘the strong claim that epistemic justification is 
necessary for reasonable belief’ and the ‘the weak claim that epistemic justification is 
necessary for reasonable belief’.71   
In the last section I assumed that the strong claim about knowledge was false and 
argued at length that the weak claim was as well.  In this section, however, I will argue that 
although the strong claim about epistemic justification is false, the weak claim about 
epistemic justification is true.  That is, I will argue that epistemically justified belief about 
something is necessary for reasonable belief.  In the next section I’ll use this conclusion to 
argue that certain types of justification skepticisms have (drastic) practical significance. 
The classic argument against the strong claim about epistemic justification is that 
having pragmatic justification for believing that p is often sufficient to make one 
reasonable in believing that p.  My favorite examples of such cases involve self-fulfilling 
prophecy.  Here’s one: 
 
Jack is the quarterback for the Mountaineers, a college football team that is 
schedule to play the Wolverines this Saturday.  Unfortunately for Jack and the 
Mountaineers, all of the evidence available to Jack supports the propositions that his 
team will lose, and lose by a lot.  (Suppose, for example, that the Mountaineers play 
in a “lower” subdivision of college football than do the Wolverines—who are 
highly ranked within their subdivision—and that the Mountaineer players are 
generally recognized to be of much lower quality than the Wolverine players.)  But 
still, Jack believes that his team will win, and he refuses to consider any evidence to 
the contrary.  He refuses to even look at the evidence, he says, because it might lead 
                                                
71 Note that whereas almost no philosophers have accepted the strong claim about knowledge, many 
philosophers have accepted the strong claim about epistemic justification  The classic example of the latter, of 
course, is William Clifford (1877). 
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him to believe that his team will lose, which will in turn make it more likely that his 
team will lose. 
 
In such a situation, Jack lacks epistemic justification for his belief that his team will win: 
the available evidence supports the proposition that his team will lose, not win.72  However, 
it seems that Jack’s pragmatic justification for holding his belief outweighs his lack of 
epistemic justification and so he is, all things considered, reasonable to hold his belief. 
 Cases such as these seem to show that the strong claim that epistemic justification is 
necessary for reasonable belief—the claim that epistemically justified belief that p is 
necessary for having a reasonable belief that p—is false.  Of course, defenders of the strong 
claim have responses to arguments such as this.  Fortunately, we not get involved in these 
disputes here.  My primary purpose in this section is not to show that the strong claim is 
false; it is, rather, to show that weak claim is true.  Hence, if you accept the strong claim, 
which entails the weak claim, all the better for me!  Such readers may feel free to skip 
ahead to the next section. 
 Short of accepting the strong claim, why accept the weak claim?  Consider again 
the reason to reject the strong claim: the strong claim ought to be rejected because mere 
pragmatic justification for a belief is often sufficient to make that belief reasonable.  This 
suggests (but does not entail) that either pragmatic justification or epistemic justification is 
necessary for reasonable belief.  Suppose that’s so.  Now suppose, as I will argue below, 
that epistemic justification for a belief about something is required for pragmatic 
                                                
72 Jim Joyce reminds me that in typical cases of self-fulfilling prophecy, such as the one considered here, the 
agent often has some evidence for the belief merely in virtue of having that belief—that is to say, the agent’s 
merely having the belief, it must be admitted, is at least some (however very little) evidence that the belief is 
true.  Nevertheless, note that in the case at hand, and indeed in most cases of this sort, the agent does not 
thereby have enough evidence to pragmatically justify him in his belief.  Thus, the example still serves our 
purpose. 
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justification for a belief that p.  If that’s so, then epistemic justification about something is 
necessary for a reasonable belief that p. 
 Now to make good on the promissory note: why think that epistemic justification 
for a belief about something is necessary for pragmatic justification?  Well, what does it 
take to have a pragmatically justified belief?  As a first pass, we might try saying 
something like this: S has a pragmatically justified belief that p if and only if S’s having the 
belief that p leads to better consequences than S’s not having the belief that p.  But we can 
quickly see that this isn’t right. 
 
Bridget holds an ordinary lottery ticket in an ordinary state lottery.  However, 
because Bridget is a wishful thinker, she believes that her ticket will win.  Because 
she believes this, Bridget takes out a large loan to buy a piece of land that (A) 
would no longer have been available for purchase by the time the lottery winner is 
announced and (B) is going to make Bridget quite a lot of money, but (C) won’t 
make Bridget any money until well after she will have to pay back the loan.  As it 
happens, Bridget wins the lottery and all is wonderful. 
 
Was Bridget pragmatically justified in believing that her ticket will win?  It doesn’t seem 
so, and this is despite the fact that, as it happens, her having that belief led to better 
consequences than her not having that belief would have led to. 
 The primary difference between the case of Bridget and the lottery and the case of 
Jack and the football game seems to be this: Jack, but not Bridget, has epistemic 
justification for believing that holding his belief will lead to better consequences than not 
holding it.  It is in virtue of this, I suggest, that Jack is pragmatically justified in holding his 
belief.  If that’s right, then epistemic justification for a belief about something is necessary 
for pragmatic justification for a belief that p.  Hence, the weak claim is true: epistemic 
justification for a belief about something is necessary for reasonable belief that p. 
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Fortunately for the purposes of the next section, our argument actually establishes 
something a bit more precise than the weak claim.  It establishes this: if S has a reasonable 
belief that p, then either (1) S is epistemically justified in believing that p, or (2) S is 
epistemically justified in believing that his believing that p will lead to better consequences 
than his not believing that p.  As we’re about to see, this implies that certain justification 
skepticisms have (drastic) practical significance. 
 
V.  The Practical Significance of Some Justification Skepticisms 
Suppose you’re watching a giant boulder roll down a hill in your direction and you have 
two options: stay put or move out of the way.  Which is the thing to do?  Given the 
reasonable-belief principle, which action is the thing to do depends on what it is reasonable 
for you to believe.  In this situation, which action is the thing to do will depend on whether 
it is reasonable for you to believe that a giant boulder is heading in your direction: if it is 
reasonable for you to believe that, then the thing to do is to get out of the way; if it is not 
reasonable for you to believe that, then perhaps ‘stay put’ is equally the thing to do—that 
is, ‘move out of the way’ is not uniquely the thing to do. 
 So our question is this: is it reasonable for you to believe that there is a giant 
boulder rolling down the hill in your direction?  Most of us will want to say ‘yes’.  But if 
justification skepticism about the external world is true, then you don’t have any epistemic 
justification for your belief that there is a giant boulder rolling down the hill in your 
direction.  Still, that doesn’t mean that you aren’t reasonable in believing that a giant 
boulder is rolling down the hill in your direction.  After all, you might have pragmatic 
reason to believe this, and if so, your belief might still be reasonable. 
Assuming justification skepticism about the external world, our question becomes 
this: do you have pragmatic justification for believing that there is a giant boulder rolling 
down the hill in your direction.  It might seem that the answer is ‘yes’, for the following 
reason: since we are assuming that there really is a boulder rolling down the hill in your 
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direction, believing that there is a boulder rolling down the hill in your direction is going to 
have better consequences than not believing that there is a giant boulder rolling down the 
hill in your direction. 
But recall the conclusion of the last section: to have pragmatic justification for your 
belief it is not sufficient that it merely be the case that holding the belief has better 
consequences than not holding it (recall the case of Bridget and the lottery).  Rather, one 
must have epistemic justification for believing that holding the belief has better 
consequences than not holding it.  But do you have epistemic justification for believing that 
holding the belief that there is a boulder rolling down the hill in your direction will have 
better consequences than not holding that belief?  Not, it seems, if justification skepticism 
about the external world is correct: since you have no epistemic justification for believing 
that there is a boulder rolling down the hill in your direction, you have no epistemic 
justification for believing that your holding the belief that there is such a boulder will result 
in your moving and thus result not getting crushed, while your not holding that belief will 
result in your not moving and thus getting crushed. 
But wait.  There’s a hole in the argument.  For it might be possible, as far as 
justification skepticism about the external world is concerned, to have epistemically 
justified beliefs about the ‘internal world’ consequences of believing/not believing that 
there is a giant boulder rolling in your direction.73  For example, as far as justification 
skepticism about the external world is concerned, you may have epistemic justification for 
believing that your not believing that there is a giant boulder heading in your direction will 
result in your having sensations as if you are being crushed, while your believing that there 
is a giant boulder heading in your direction will result in your not having sensations as if 
you are being crushed.  And having sensations as if you are being crushed is much worse 
than not having sensations as if you are being crushed.  Thus, justification skepticism 
about the external world is compatible with your being pragmatically justified in believing 
                                                
73 The assumption here is that external-world justification skepticism could be true while justification 
skepticism about patterns of (future) sense experiences is not. 
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that there is a giant boulder rolling in your direction, and hence it is compatible with your 
being reasonable in believing that there is a giant boulder heading in your direction.  
Hence, it seems that justification skepticism about the external world does not have 
implications for which action is the thing to do in this case.74 
 As successful as this line of reasoning might be in the case of the giant boulder, the 
trouble is that it is not generally successful.  In fact, it is successful only in a very limited 
range of cases.  Here is one of the many cases in which the above strategy will not work.  
Suppose that you receive a Christmas bonus and have to decide whether to spend the 
money on a fast new car or give the money to a charity that urgently needs it.  Given the 
reasonable-belief principle, which of these is the thing to do depends on what it is 
reasonable to believe.  In particular, it depends on whether it is reasonable to believe things 
like: 
 
1.  If you give the money to the charity, then starving people will be fed; if you 
spend the money on a fast new car, you’ll get to drive a fast new car.  
 
Again, according to justification skepticism about the external world, those beliefs are not 
epistemically justified.  But are they pragmatically justified? 
 Let’s try the reasoning of two paragraphs back.  Although given justification 
skepticism about the external world, you are not epistemically justified in believing 
anything about the ‘external world’ consequences of your believing/not believing (1), you 
are epistemically justified in believing certain things about the ‘internal world’ 
consequences of believing (1).  Following the above line of reasoning, we’ll then say this: 
you have epistemic justification for believing that your believing (1) will more likely result 
in your having sensations as if starving people are being fed than it will result in your 
                                                
74  In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke can plausibly be read as offering such a 
response to skepticism about the external world (IV.xii.8). 
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having sensations as if you’re driving a fast car, while your not believing (1) will be just as 
likely to result in either.  But here’s the rub: if you’re like me, and you’d rather, all other 
things being equal, have sensations as if you’re driving a fast car than have sensations as if 
starving people are being fed, then this pragmatically justifies you in not believing (1).  It 
does not pragmatically justify you in believing (1).  Hence, if justification skepticism about 
the external world is true, then you are neither epistemically nor pragmatically justified in 
believing (1), and hence you are not reasonable in believing (1).  Justification skepticism 
about the external world thus has practical significance in this case. 
 Cases such as the last one are ubiquitous.  They occur whenever, roughly speaking, 
the relative values we place on sensations (or ‘internal-world’ states of affairs) come apart 
from the relative values we place on the external-world states of affairs that we commonly 
believe are responsible for those sensations.  Consider these: being loved vs having 
sensations as if one is loved, climbing Mount Everest vs having sensations as if climbing 
Mount Everest, talking to an old friend vs having sensations as if talking to an old friend.  
Given that the values we place on sensations nearly universally comes apart from the 
values we place on the external-world states of affairs that we believe are responsible for 
them, I conclude that justification skepticism about the external-world, given the 
reasonable-belief principle, has drastic practical significance. 
 Can we generalize from the case of justification skepticism about the external 
world?  Do all forms of justification skepticism have practical significance?  In the next 
section I will argue that the answer is ‘no’: all Kantian skepticisms are in a certain sense 
self-immunized for practical significance.  Accordingly, it will come to light that we have 
been implicitly assuming the external-world justification skepticism at issue in this section 
was a Cartesian skepticism. 
 
Section Six: The Practical Insignificance of Kantian Skepticisms 
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Above I said that a Kantian skeptic is, by definition, one who accepts an argument of 
something like the following form: 
 
1.  We cannot grasp the proposition p. 
2.  Therefore, we cannot know/justifiably believe that p. 
 
Let us call (1) the Kantian skeptic’s conceptual premise and let us call (2) the Kantian 
skeptic’s skeptical thesis. 
 My thesis in this section is that if the Kantian skeptic’s conceptual premise is true, 
then her skeptical thesis has no practical significance.75  In this way, Kantian skepticisms 
are self-immunized for practical significance. 
Here, in its barest outline, is the argument for my thesis. 
 
Relevance.  Skepticism with respect to p has practical significance only if p is a 
subjunctive conditional A□→O such that A is an action that is (sometimes) 
available to us and O is an outcome upon which we place some value. 76,77 
 
Kantian Irrelevance.  If a Kantian conceptual premise with respect to p is true, 
then p is not a subjunctive conditional A□→O such that A is an action that is 
(sometimes) available to us and O is an outcome upon which we place some value. 
 
                                                
75 Below I’ll quickly show (1) why we cannot drop the antecedent from my thesis and (2) why the Kantian’s 
conceptual premise itself might have practical significance. 
76 A skepticism with respect to p, as I am using the phrase, is any view that entails that we cannot 
know/justifiably believe that p.  Thus, a skepticism need not be explicitly about p to be a skepticism with a 
respect to p. 
77 ‘Value’ is used generally here to include negative values as well as positive values. 
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My Thesis.  Therefore, if a Kantian’s conceptual premise is true, her skeptical 
thesis has no practical significance.  
 
The argument is clearly valid; let’s consider the premises.   
The formal argument for Relevance goes as follows.  Recall the reasonable-belief 
principle and the definition of expected utility given above. 
 
The Reasonable-Belief Principle:  A is the thing for S to do if and only if A has 
highest expected utility given S’s desires and the beliefs that it is reasonable for S 
to have. 
 
U(A) = ∑O P(A□→O)V(O) 
 
The definition of expected utility entails that one’s credence that p is relevant to which 
action has highest expected utility only if p is a subjunctive conditional A□→O such that A 
is an action available to the agent and O is an outcome upon which she places some value.  
This, together with the reasonable-belief principle, entails that which action is the thing to 
do depends on the reasonableness of having a certain credence that p, only if p is a 
subjunctive conditional A□→O such that A is an action available to the agent and O is an 
outcome upon which she places some value.  This, generalized to all of us, is just what 
Relevance says. 
 That’s the formal argument.  Let’s make it more intuitive.  Consider a proposition p 
such that, were we not thinking carefully about these matters, we might think that which 
action was the thing to do did depend on the reasonableness of having a certain credence 
that p.  For example, let p be the proposition that the restaurant is to the right and suppose 
you’re at a fork in the road, trying to get to the restaurant.  We might, were we not thinking 
clearly about theses matters, think that which action was the thing to do depends (in part) 
on whether it is reasonable to believe that the restaurant is to the right.   
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But here is why this isn’t quite right.  Typically, when it is reasonable to believe 
that the restaurant is to the right, it will also be reasonable to believe that were you to go to 
the right, then you would get to the restaurant.  In those cases, the thing to do will be to go 
to the right.  However, there are possible situations where it is perfectly reasonable to 
believe all three of the following: (1) that the restaurant is to the right, (2) that were you to 
go to the right you would not get to the restaurant (say, because of a roadblock), and (3) 
that were you to go to the left you would get to the restaurant (say, because of a detour).  In 
this situation, the thing to do is to go to the left.  Hence, we can see that which action is the 
thing to do does not track the reasonableness of believing that the restaurant is to the right: 
it tracks the reasonableness of believing that were you to go right, then you would get to the 
restaurant (and similar subjunctive conditionals).  This is just what standard (causal) 
decision theory predicts, and it is just what Relevance says. 
 What about the second premise of the argument, Kantian Irrelevance?  The 
argument for this premise is trickier.  It’s premised on a pair of principles I call 
 
The Action-Grasping Principle.  If S has no grasp on A, then A is not one of the 
actions available to S. 
 
The Outcome-Grasping Principle.  If S has no grasp on O, then the agent cannot 
place a value on O. 
 
In slogan form, these principles simply say that we cannot do nor want what we cannot 
grasp.   
 Let’s consider the action-grasping principle first.  The following case should 
illustrate its plausibility. 
 
Cory is a small child who knows nothing about electricity, yet knows that his toy 
car needs a new battery.  Now he’s faced with a choice as to which way to install 
 97 
the battery.  Question: is put the positive electrode to the right one of the actions 
available to him—that is, is put the positive electrode to the right something that he 
can intend to do?   
 
The answer, it seems, is ‘no’.  Of course, put the side marked ‘+’ to the right is probably 
one of the actions available to Cory.  But it doesn’t seem that put the positive electrode to 
the right is something that Cory can intend to do, and hence it isn’t an action available to 
Cory in the sense of ‘available’ required by decision theory.  But why is that not an action 
that Cory can intend to do?  Cory cannot intend to put the positive electrode to the right 
because Cory has no grasp on what it would be to put the positive electrode to the right.  
This, generalized, is just what the action-grasping principle says. 
 How about the outcome-grasping principle?  The following case should illustrate its 
plausibility. 
 
Kathryn is trying to decide what to order for dinner.  One of the items on the menu 
is sashimi.  Kathryn, however, has never had sashimi, nor has she ever had anything 
that tastes anything like sashimi.  Let O be the true, maximally specific proposition 
about what it is like to taste sashimi. 
 
Question: is O a possible outcome upon which Kathryn can place some value?  The 
answer, it seems, is ‘no’.  Of course, Kathryn can place a value on the outcome 
experiencing whatever taste it is that one experiences upon tasting sashimi.  But that is not 
the same as placing a value on O, and, having never tasted sashimi nor anything like 
sashimi, it doesn’t seem that Kathryn can place a value on O.  (The difference between O 
and experiencing whatever taste it is that one experiences upon tasting sashimi is similar to 
the difference between meeting Barack Obama and meeting the president, whoever he is.)  
Now why can’t Kathryn place a value on O?  Kathryn cannot place a value on O because 
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Kathryn has no grasp on O.  This, generalized, is just what the outcome-grasping principle 
says. 
 Together, the two grasping principles entail the second premise of our argument, 
which I repeat here for convenience: 
 
Kantian Irrelevance.  If a Kantian conceptual premise with respect to p is true, 
then p is not a subjunctive conditional A□→O such that A is action that is 
(sometimes) available to us and O is an outcome upon which we place some value. 
 
Suppose that some Kantian’s conceptual premise is true with respect to some proposition p.  
Now, either p is a subjunctive conditional or it isn’t.  If it isn’t, then the consequence of the 
second premise is true.  If it is a subjunctive conditional, then it is a subjunctive conditional 
such that we do not grasp that subjunctive conditional (by the assumption that the 
Kantian’s conceptual premise is true).  But that could be the case only if we either do not 
grasp its antecedent or we do not grasp its consequent.  But this entails, together with the 
grasping principles, that either the action appearing in the antecedent is not an action 
available to us or the outcome appearing in the consequent is not an outcome upon which 
we place some value.  In other words, the consequent of Kantian Irrelevance is true.  
Hence, the grasping principles entail Kantian Irrelevance. 
 With Relevance and Kantian Irrelevance in place, our argument for the practical 
insignificance of Kantian skepticisms is complete.78  Combining this result with the result 
                                                
78 Given this conclusion, note that in the preceding section we must have been assuming that the external-
world skepticism under consideration was a Cartesian skepticism.  If we had instead been dealing with a 
Kantian skepticism about the external world, we would not have been entitled to assume that we place values 
on, for example, the state of affairs in which starving people are being fed.  So what we were really seeing in 
the previous section was an example of a Cartesian skepticism that has practical significance.  This of course 
does not prove that all Cartesian skepticisms have practical significance.  But it does prove that some 
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of the previous section gives the conclusion that only justification-Cartesian skepticism 
have practical significance. 
 






But I must stress two things.  First, our conclusion about Kantian skepticisms is a 
conditional: if the Kantian’s conceptual premise is true, then the Kantian’s skeptical 
conclusion has no practical significance.  Second, our conclusion is not that the Kantian’s 
conceptual premise has no practical significance.  In fact, there are reasons to think it often 
will have practical significance.  Let me briefly say why. 
 Consider the case of Kathryn above.  In such a case, it seems that a Kantian 
conceptual premise is true: Kathryn has no grasp on p, such that p is the true proposition 
about what it’s like to taste sashimi.  As we have established, given this conceptual 
premise, the skeptical conclusion that Kathryn does not know/justifiably believe that p, has 
no practical significance.  However, the conceptual claim itself might have practical 
significance.  Because Kathryn cannot grasp p, she will not be able to place a value on 
tasting sashimi (in accordance with the outcome grasping principle says).  This will 
typically mean that the expected utility of, say, ordering sashimi will be indeterminate, 
which will in turn mean that it is indeterminate which action has highest expected utility.  
However, if she could grasp p, then Kathryn could place a value on tasting sashimi and 
then there would be some determinate action or set of actions with highest expected utility.  
                                                
Cartesian skepticisms have practical significance, and that all Cartesian skepticism at least have the potential 
for practical significance in a way that no Kantian skepticism ever could. 
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In this way, Kathryn’s not being able to grasp p itself has practical significance—that is, 
the Kantian skeptic’s conceptual premise itself has practical significance.  But none of this, 
of course, undermines our claim that if the Kantian conceptual premise is true, the Kantian 
skeptical conclusion has no practical significance.   
 
Section Seven:  A Happy Ending 
I’d like to conclude on a pleasant note.  Take some proposition p.  We’ve distinguished 
four skeptical attitudes one might have towards a belief that p and seen that only one of 
these types has practical significance.  But note this: the type of skepticism with practical 
significance—justification-Cartesian skepticism—is the easiest type of skepticism to 
refute. 
Why is justification-Cartesian skepticism the easiest type of skepticism to refute?  
The justification-Cartesian skeptic allows that we can conceive of p, but merely denies that 
we can be justified in believing that p.  In our attempts at refuting the justification-
Cartesian skepticism we are thus allowed to assume that we can grasp p.  This makes the 
task of showing that we are justified in believing that p against the justification-Cartesian 
skeptic considerably easier than the task of showing that we are justified in believing that p 
against the justification-Kantian skeptic.  To show that we are justified in believing that p 
against the justification-Kantian skeptic requires a sort of preliminary step—showing that 
we can grasp p—without which there is presumably no hope in showing that we are 
justified in believing that p.  In short, one who would attempt to refute justification-
Cartesian skepticism has a sort of dialectical advantage over one who would try to refute 
justification-Kantian skepticism.   
Moreover, refuting either kind of knowledge skepticism entails (on the assumption 
that knowledge is sufficient for justification) a refutation of either kind of justification 
skepticism.  Thus, one who would attempt to refute either kind of justification skepticism 
has a sort of logical advantage over one who would attempt to refute either kind of 
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knowledge skepticism.  But a logical advantage is a dialectical advantage, and hence the 
opponent of either type of justification skepticism has a dialectical advantage over the 
opponent of either type of knowledge skepticism. 
So our situation is a happy one: the only type of skepticism with practical 
significance is, dialectically at least, the easiest skepticism to refute.  Conversely: the only 
type of skepticism with practical significance is, dialectically at least, the hardest 
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